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The area of research for this thesis is the acquisition of "over and above work" in 
ship repair contracts. The objective of this research is to explore the use of the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (OF ARS) "over and above work" provisions 
in ship repair contracts. The thesis addresses how the OF ARS "over and above work" 
provisions should be incorporated into ship repair contracts. Particular attention is given 
to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) San Diego. CA 
incorporation of the OF ARS "over and above work" provisions as a local test in the 
solicitation and contract for the USS ELLIOT (DD-967) February 1994 to May 1994 
Selected Restricted Availability (SRA). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The area of research for this thesis is the acquisition of "over and above work" in 
ship repair contracts. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (OF ARS) 
has made available another tool for the ship repair contract administration toolbox, the 
"over and above work" concept. It is important that the use of this tool is explored. It is 
anticipated that this thesis will contribute towards the incorporation of the OF ARS "over 
and above work" provisions into Department of Defense (DOD) ship repair contracts. 
A. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to explore the use of the OF ARS "over and above 
work" provisions in ship repair contracts. Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and 
Repair (SUPSHIP) San Diego, CA incorporated the OF ARS "over and above work" 
provisions as a local test in the solicitation and contract for the USS ELLIOT (DD-967) 
February 1994 to May 1994 Selected Restricted Availability (SRA). The contract, 
contract number N62791-94-C-0018 dated 21 January 1994, was awarded to Southwest 
Marine, Inc. (SWM) in San Diego, CA. This thesis will include an analysis of the test 
results, lessons learned, and positive and negative feedback from Government and 
contractor personnel involved with the ELLIOT SRA contract. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is as follows: How should the OF ARS "over and 
above work" provisions be incorporated into ship repair contracts? 
The subsidiary research questions are as follows: 
1. What is "over and above work?" 
2. To what extent is "over and above work" discovered during ship repair contract 
performance? 
3. What are the significant benefits m using the "over and above work" 
provisions in ship repair contracts? 
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4. What are the significant problems m usmg the "over and above work" 
provisions in ship repair contracts? 
5. How is "over and above work" currently being addressed m ship repair 
contracts? 
6. What modifications should be made to the DFARS "over and above work" 
provisions? 
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THESIS 
RESEARCH 
The main thrust of this thesis is to investigate the acquisition of "over and above 
work" in DOD contracts for the performance of maintenance, overhaul and repair of 
ships. The thesis is an assessment of SUPS HIP San Diego's incorporation of the DF ARS 
"over and above work" provisions in the ELLIOT SRA contract. 
The thesis conclusions and recommendations are based on the local test results of 
the ELLIOT SRA contract, which is the only SUPSHIP San Diego awarded ship repair 
contract that incorporated the DFARS "over and above work" provisions and that was 
also completed at the time of this thesis research effort. 
An assumption of this thesis is that the reader has a basic understanding of the 
SUPSHIP ship repair contract administration environment and processes. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Information used in the preparation of this thesis was obtained through literature 
search, available documentation, personal interviews, and survey questionnaires. The 
literature provided background information on cost growth and schedule overruns of 
Navy ship overhaul and repair contracts at private and public shipyards. Available 
documentation provided background information on "over and above work" and 
identified the chronology of events leading to the current situation regarding "over and 
above work" at SUPSHIP San Diego. The personal interviews provided feedback from 
Government and contractor personnel involved with the ELLIOT SRA contract. The 
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survey questionnaires provided information and comments regarding "over and above 
work" from contracting personnel at other SUPSHIP offices which administer ship repair 
contracts. 
E. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 
"Over and above work" means work discovered during the course of performing 
overhaul, maintenance, and repair efforts that is within the general scope of the contract, 
not covered by the line item(s) for the basic work under the contract, and necessary in 
order to satisfactorily complete the contract. [Ref. 5:252.217-25 and 26] 
"Over and above work" request means a document prepared by the contractor 
which describes "over and above work" being proposed. [Ref. 5:252.217-26] 
Delay and disruption (D & D) costs refer to the costs of contract performance that 
the contractor incurs as a result of some act qr failure to act on the part of the 
Government. Contractors prepare their bids taking into account a certain number of 
variables, such as the type of ship, weather, availability of labor, materials, equipment, 
etc. Costs associated with delay are those costs which result from an extended 
performance period, resulting in increased overhead and job site costs, extended 
equipment rentals, standby costs, wage escalation, financing costs. etc. Costs associated 
with disruption are those costs which result from a disruption of the planned method, 
timing, and sequence of operations, resulting in a loss of efficiency during contract 
performance. Disruption costs are likely to be increased labor costs due to inefficiency, 
additional labor placed on the job to compensate for the inefficiencies, increased costs 
due to the activation-deactivation of work (set-up/breakdown), etc. [Ref. 1: V -1 ,V -11, and 
V-13] 
A glossary of acronyms is included in Appendix A. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II will present background information for this thesis and an overview of 
the "over and above work" concept. Chapter II will also identify how "over and above 
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work" is currently being addressed in ship repair contracts. Chapter III will present data 
on the amount and impact of "over and above work" in ship repair contracts. Chapter IV 
will be an analysis of the test results. lessons learned. and positive and negative feedback 
from Government and contractor personnel involved with the ELLIOT SRA contract. 
Chapter IV will also be an analysis of the "over and above work" concept and the issue of 
ship repair contractors recovering losses through contract modifications. Chapter V will 
present conclusions, recommendations, and brief answers to the research questions. 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information for this thesis 
and an overview of the "over and above work" concept. This chapter also identifies how 
the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and selected SUPSHIP offices address "over and 
above work." This chapter identifies the chronology of events leading to the current 
situation involving "over and above work" at SUPSHIP San Diego. In addition, this 
chapter identifies the concerns which Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 028, the 
code at NAVSEA which is responsible for overseeing the contracting policies and 
procedures at all of the SUPSHIP offices throughout the United States, and SUPSHIP San 
Diego's Office ·of General Counsel (OGC) have regarding the incorporation of the 
DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into ship repair contracts. Also, this chapter 
presents the finding of a Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) audit of the 
control of "over and above work" for contract depot maintenance. 
B. "OVER AND ABOVE WORK" 
The new DF ARS Subpart 217.77, "Over and Above Work," which introduces a 
concept new to the Navy, is provided as Appendix B. "Over and above work," also 
known as growth work or emergent work, is work discovered during the course of 
performing overhaul, maintenance, and repair efforts that is within the general scope of 
the contract, not covered by the line item(s) for the basic work under the contract, and 
necessary in order to satisfactorily complete the work necessary to make the ship ready 
for sea. [Ref. 5:252.217-25 and 26] 
Contracts for the performance of maintenance, overhaul, modification, and repair 
of various items (e.g., aircraft, engines, ground support equipment, ships) generally 
contain "over and above work" requirements. When they do, the Subpart indicates that 
the Contracting Officer is to establish a separate contract line item for the "over and 
above work." [Ref. 3 :217.77-1] 
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Scheduled maintenance actions for carrying out general repair and alterations are 
called regular overhauls. Regular overhauls for the more complex Navy ships, such as 
submarines and carriers, are generally done in naval shipyards. Overhauls for less 
complex ships. such as auxiliary and amphibious ships, are routinely done in private 
shipyards. In the past, the Navy used both fixed-price contracts and cost type contracts to 
obtain ship maintenance from private shipyards. In May 1985, however, the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) directed that fixed-price contracting be the primary acquisition 
strategy for ship overhauls. Under a fixed-price contract, a contractor agrees to perform 
work for a specific amount. The price is not subject to adjustment on the basis of a 
contractor's cost experience in performing the contract. A cost type contract provides for 
payment of allowable incurred costs to the extent prescribed in the contract. [Ref. 9:4] 
NA VSEA is responsible for the overhaul and repair of Navy ships. Its Industrial 
and Facility Management Directorate has management control of the naval shipyards and 
SUPSHIP offices. The SUPSHIP offices plan and manage the overhaul ofNavy ships in 
private shipyards located in their geographical areas. [Ref. 9:4] 
The Navy has moved from regular scheduled overhauls performed every three to 
four years toward shorter, more frequent, intermittent depot level repairs called SRAs and 
phased maintenance availabilities. Under the various maintenance strategies, the Navy 
maintains, repairs, and sometimes makes improvements to modernize ships. Assignment 
of a ship to a repair activity for this work is called an availability. [Ref. 1 0:8] 
According to Navy officials, identifying all required maintenance on a Navy ship 
is almost impossible until a ship is dry-docked and cut open, the power plant is shut 
down, and the ship and equipment are inspected and tested. For example, after dry-
docking the USS DIXON (AS-3 7), the Navy found accelerated deterioration of the hull. 
Repairing the hull added $7 million to the contract cost and extended the dry-docking 
time by sixty days. The Navy and contractors have to modify the contraCts to accomplish 
the additional work that is subsequently identified. Unlike the contract award price that is 
influenced by competition, the price of contract modifications is negotiated solely with 
the contractor. [Ref. 10: 16] 
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Even if the ship is not dry-docked during the availability. identifying all required 
maintenance may not be possible until equipment panels are removed or pieces of 
equipment are opened and inspected. Examples of equipment that may reveal "over and 
above work" include diesel engines, turbine generators, and boilers. 
"Over and above work" requirements task the contractor to identify needed repairs 
and recommend corrective action during contract performance. The contractor submits a 
work request to identify the "over and above work" and, as appropriate. the Government 
authorizes the contractor to proceed. [Ref. 3:21 7. 77-1] 
The "Over and Above Work" Clause at 252.217-7028, which is provided as 
Appendix C, requires the contractor and the Contracting Officer responsible for 
administering the contract, the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), to negotiate 
specific procedures for Government administration and contractor performance of "over 
and above work" requests. If the parties cannot agr:ee upon the procedures, the ACO has 
the unilateral right to direct the "over and above work" procedures to be followed. These 
procedures, as a minimum, are to cover the format, content, and submission of work 
requests by the contractor, the Government review, verification, and authorization of the 
work, and proposal pricing, submission, negotiation, and definitization. [Ref. 5:252.217-
26] 
Upon discovery of the need for "over and above work," the contractor is to 
prepare and furnish to the Government a work request in accordance with the agreed-to 
procedures. The Government is to then promptly review the work request, verify that the 
proposed work is required and not covered under the basic contract line item(s), verify 
that the proposed corrective action is appropriate, and authorize the "over and above 
work" as necessary. In addition, the contractor is to promptly submit to the Contracting 
Officer a proposal for the "over and above work." The Government and contractor will 
then negotiate a settlement for the "over and above work." Failure to agree on the price 
of "over and above work" is a dispute within the meaning of the contract's Disputes 
Clause. [Ref. 5:252.217 -26] 
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The Subpart indicates that "over and above work" is considered to be within the 
scope of the contract. This is significant because, if "over and above work" was not 
considered to be within the scope of the contract, it would be considered new work. New 
work, or work outside the scope of the contract, is not supposed to be added to the basic 
contract without being subject to the normal competitive acquisition process. To the 
maximum extent practical, "over and above work" is to be negotiated prior to 
performance of the work. [Ref. 3 :21 7. 77-1] 
C. CURRENT PRACTICES 
The information presented in this section is taken from survey questionnaire 
responses received from the MSC and selected SUPSHIP offices. Based on the survey 
questionnaire responses, various methods are used to address "over and above work" in 
ship repair contracts. 
As an alternative to usmg the DFARS "Over and Above Work" Clause at 
252.217-7028, the MSC has approval to use its Additional Requirements Clause, which is 
provided as Appendix D. The Additional Requirements Clause is designed to estimate 
actual contractor man-hour requirements for an availability, competitively preprice 
emergent work, and reduce claims for D & D due to emergent work. The contractor 
submits, as part of its proposal, a line item price for a block of additional requirements 
man-hours established by the Government. This line item price is a fully loaded rate that 
includes general and administrative (G&A) expense, profit, D & D costs, and direct labor 
costs. The number of additional requirements man-hours established by the Government 
predicts the level of undefined emergent work and varies with the ship and the 
availability type. [Ref. 14:5-6] 
With the "Over and Above Work" Clause, the contractor initiates the action, while 
the Government, rather than the contractor, will normally initiate the action with the 
Additional Requirements Clause. The Additional Requirements Clause requires the 
contractor to plan for additional work such that it will not cause D & D or acceleration of 
the original work. The "Over and Above Work" Clause calls for the contractor and 
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Government to mutually agree to procedures for Government administration and 
contractor performance of "over and above work." while the Additional Requirements 
Clause sets forth. in advance of contract performance. the procedures which will be 
follow·ed. [Ref. 14:3] 
The "Over and Above Work" Clause does not define the period of performance or 
ordering period for the additional work. while the Additional Requirements Clause 
establishes the amount of additional work that may be ordered and requires that it be 
performed within the original contract period. This permits the contractor to plan for and 
preprice D & D costs and to prepare adequate work plans anticipating the additional 
work. Also, since the additional hours are included in the contractor's proposal, the 
Contracting Officer is able to evaluate whether the proposed contractor has the necessary 
manpower capability to perform the work required by the contract. [Ref. 14:3-4] 
Another difference in the clauses is that the Additional Requirements Clause 
describes the labor mix (i.e., categories and definitions of direct production hours are 
provided) and the Government gets a fixed labor rate for the additional work prior to 
award which can be used in the evaluation of offers. The Additional Requirements 
Clause also gives the Government the option of having additional work performed by the 
Government or by a third party in those cases where the contractor and Government 
cannot agree on a fair and reasonable price for the additional work. [Ref. 14:4] 
Three SUPSHIP offices responded that they utilize the Changes Clause at 
252.217-7003, which is provided as Appendix E, to get "over and above work" negotiated 
into the contract as a growth item. The Changes Clause states that the Contracting 
Officer may, at any time, by written change order. make changes within the general scope 
of the contract in drawings, designs, plans, and specifications, work itemized, place of 
performance of the work, time of commencement or completion of the work, and any 
other requirement of the contract. [Ref. 4:252.217-3] 
If a change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or time required for, 
performance of the contract, whether or not changed by the order, the Contracting Officer 
is to make an equitable adjustment in the price or date of completion, or both, and is to 
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modify the contract in writing. Within ten days after the contractor receives notification 
of the change, the contractor is to submit to the Contracting Officer a request for price 
adjustment, together with a written estimate of the increased cost. The Contracting 
Officer may grant an extension of this period if the contractor requests it within the ten 
day period. If the circumstances justify it, the Contracting Officer may accept and grant a 
request for equitable adjustment at any later time prior to final payment under the 
contract, except that the contractor may not receive profit on a payment under a late 
request. [Ref. 4:252.217-3] 
The Changes Clause also states that, if the contractor includes in its claim the cost 
of property made obsolete or excess as a result of a change, the Contracting Officer has 
the right to prescribe the manner of disposition of that property. Also, failure to agree to 
any adjustment shall be a dispute within the meaning of the contract's Disputes Clause. 
Finally, nothing in the Changes Clause shall excus~ the contractor from proceeding with 
the contract as changed. [Ref. 4:252.217-3 and 4] 
One of the three SUPSHIP offices responded that usually the price is settled 
before the contractor does the work, but at other times the contractor is reluctant to get 
locked into a price because of the uncertainty of exactly what it will take to do the job. In 
these cases, this SUPSHIP office usually uses a max-priced modification to get the work 
into the contract and then settles on the price as soon as the work can be fully defined. A 
max-priced modification is an Undefinitized Contractual Action (UCA), which is a 
bilateral agreement between the Government and the contractor that allows the contractor 
to proceed with performance while the firm-fixed-price (FFP) modification is negotiated. 
However, the FFP negotiated will not be allowed to exceed the cap or ceiling price in the 
max-priced modification. If there is no agreement at all as to cost and time impact, and 
the work must be done during the current availability, this SUPSHIP office will issue a 
unilateral change order to incorporate the work into the contract. However, the SUPSHIP 
office says this is seldom necessary. A unilateral change order is a modification issued 
unilaterally by the Contracting Officer, directing the contractor to perform work without 
the price of the modification definitized. The unilateral change order contains a not-to-
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exceed price, which the contractor is not authorized to exceed without the Contracting 
Officer's approval. 
Another SUPSHIP office responded that, at the outset of an availability, the 
customer provides funding for "within scope" changes to the contract. This growth work 
or "over and above work" may be identified during the contract period of performance by 
either SUPSHIP or the contractor performing the work. In the latter instance, the 
contractor submits "condition found reports," which identify and describe additional 
repair requirements discovered during the performance of contract specification work 
items. The condition found report will often include recommendations for correcting the 
problem found. 
This SUPSHIP office then reviews the report and determines whether correction 
of the condition by the contractor during the performance of the contract is desirable or 
necessary. If it is a condition requiring correction, a proposal request is prepared on a 
pre-printed price proposal form, which includes revisions to the contraet specification(s) 
necessary to effect the correction. An independent Government cost estimate is also 
prepared reflecting the scope of work. The request for proposal is then forwarded to the 
contractor, who prepares a proposal for the work. 
Upon receipt of contractor proposals less than $10,000, the SUPSHIP ship 
surveyor cognizant of the trade discipline most prevalent in the changed requirement will 
review the proposal and negotiate an equitable price with the contractor. If the proposed 
price exceeds $10,000, a SUPS HIP contract negotiator will negotiate the change. In both 
cases, the adjudicated value is recorded on the pre-printed price proposal form, which is 
submitted to the Contracting Officer for review along with the business clearance 
information appropriate to the value of the change and the type of analysis performed. 
The signature of the Contracting Officer on the pre-printed form is the contractor's 
authorization to proceed with the work of the change. The negotiated price proposal 
forms are grouped together and issued on Standard Form 30 documents, bilaterally 
executed. 
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In those instances where performance of the work is of such urgency that it must 
commence before proposal submission can be accomplished or negotiated, the work is 
initiated with the issue of a minimum or maximum priced supplemental agreement, an 
unpriced supplemental agreement or a change order, as the situation permits or requires. 
Another SUPSHIP office responded that it has what is called a "condition report 
circuit", which establishes procedures for identification, authorization and negotiation of 
"over and above work." The contractor identifies a condition and provides technical 
justification for the accomplishment of the work as well as a cost estimate. The 
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR), who has limited approval 
authority, authorizes the work as appropriate. The SUP SHIP contract negotiator 
subsequently negotiates the condition reports in batches periodically with contractor 
representatives. 
Another SUPSHIP office responded that it uses supplemental agreements to 
address "over and above work" in ship repair contracts. The contractor submits a 
"condition report," notifying the SUPSHIP office that additional or growth work is 
needed. A SUPSHIP office surveyor then verifies the need and prepares a Statement of 
Work (SOW) and an independent Government cost estimate. The contractor then submits 
a proposal, which is then negotiated and incorporated by contract modification. 
D. SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO AND "OVER AND ABOVE WORK" 
Until May 1991, SUP SHIP San Diego used an impact factor system, implemented 
with a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), to negotiate D & D associated 
with changes, both growth and new work. The impact factor system was a method to 
negotiate and put into place adjustment factors that would be used to negotiate D & D. 
[Ref. 19:1] 
Government-caused D & D to contractors results in contract cost growth and 
schedule overruns. The causes for the D & D can vary from contract modifications to 
Government personnel getting in the way of a contractor's work force. The amount of the 
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claims can be significant. For example. in the $28.2 million ship repair contract for the 
USS FIFE (DD-991 ), the contractor was paid over $6 million forD & D. [Ref. 10: 17] 
In May 1991. SUPSHIP San Diego unilaterally terminated the use of the impact 
factor system because data were not available to support the factors. SUPSHIP San 
Diego returned to the only available solution at the time--trying to negotiate D & D based 
on the individual merits of the specific change. Without a method in place to negotiate D 
& D, contractors and SUPSHIP San Diego personnel have continued to search for an 
alternative method to facilitate D & D negotiations. [Ref. 19:1] 
Delay and disruption is only an issue with SUPSHIP San Diego's fixed-price 
contracts. In SUPSHIP San Diego's phased maintenance cost type contracts, D & D is 
never discussed. In a fixed-price contract environment, the contractor submits its 
proposal based on the SOW requirements in the solicitation document and is paid only 
the negotiated fixed-price of the contract to accomplish the SOW requirements. When a 
change is made to the contract SOW requirements due to growth work or "over and above 
work," the contractor may incur D & D costs, which would not have been anticipated 
when the contractor submitted its proposal based on the solicitation SOW requirements. 
Thus, in a fixed-price contract environment, the contractor will seek to be reimbursed for 
these D & D costs. In a cost type contract environment, the contractor is paid for all 
incurred allowable, reasonable, and allocable costs associated with the performance of the 
contract, including any changes to the contract SOW requirements due to "over and above 
work." The "over and above work" concept offers a tool that can facilitate D & D 
negotiations. [Ref. 19: 1] 
NAVSEA 028 authorized SUPSHIP San Diego to use the "over and above work" 
clause on a fixed-price basis. However, this does not help address the inherent D & D 
problem explained in the previous paragraph. San Diego contractors are reluctant to 
accept max-priced modifications. Issuing a change order, or modification, in a fixed-
price environment, under the provisions of the "over and above work" clause without a 
max-price, would be the same as a unilateral change order. The problem with issuing a 
unilateral change order is that, as the contractor performs the work, the contractor incurs 
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actual costs that can be used as leverage when the price of the modification is negotiated 
or definitized. This results in a loss of negotiation leverage for the Government and shifts 
the cost risk of performing the modification work from the contractor to the Government, 
as if it was a cost type modification instead of a fixed-price modification. SUPSHIP San 
Diego is reluctant to issue unilaterals because of past command experience where issuing 
unilateral change orders became abused, leaving several thousand undefinitized 
modifications. This huge volume of unilaterals had to be negotiated before the associated 
contracts could be closed out, which created a horrendous contract administration 
problem. [Ref. 19: 1] 
Given that D & D is not an issue with cost type contracts, it has been suggested 
that NAVSEA 028 investigate use of a "hybrid" contract type, with the basic package 
solicited and awarded fixed-price and the "over and above work" contract line item cost-
reimbursable. NA VSEA 028 has two primary concs;:ms: [Ref. 19:2] 
1. DFARS 217.7101(b) defines a job order under the Master Ship Repair 
Agreement (MSRA) as "fixed price." This requires that a deviation be processed through 
the Defense Acquisition Regulatory (DAR) Council to incorporate cost type language 
into the agreements. 
2. Contractors may not be able to segregate costs between fixed-price and cost 
type work to the work item level. 
Discussions with Arkhon Corporation representatives and other contractors 
indicate that segregating costs between fixed-price and cost type work to the work item 
level is indeed possible. A discussion with a local Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA) Regional Area Manager also reveals that the Air Force routinely uses this 
"hybrid" contract type for aircraft maintenance and overhauls, where the basic 
requirement is fixed-price and "over and above work" is cost-reimbursable. [Ref. 19:2] 
The benefit of using this "hybrid" contract type is that D & D is no longer an 
Issue. Disadvantages include the inability to close out contracts in a timely manner, 
coupled with additional training and contractor oversight requirements. [Ref. 19:2] 
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SUPSHIP San Diego's OGC reviewed and suggested revisions to the proposed 
draft contract clauses, the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between SUPSHIP San 
Diego and the contractor, and SUPSHIP San Diego's internal procedures memorandum, 
all of which would be used to incorporate the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions 
into the ELLIOT SRA contract. However, SUPSHIP San Diego's OGC felt that the 
purpose of the proposed contract clauses and MOA would be served by use of the 
litigation tested Additional Requirements Clause used by the MSC. [Ref. 13: 1-2] 
On 14 July 1993, SUPSHIP San Diego sent a letter to the Government and 
Contract Affairs (GCA) subcommittee of the Port of San Diego Ship Repair Association 
(SDSRA). The letter explained the "over and above work" provisions that SUPSHIP San 
Diego intended to incorporate in a future solicitation as a test to facilitate the start of 
growth work or "over and above work." The letter also requested that copies of these 
provisions be made available to members of the SDSRA and that the GCA Subcommittee 
solicit their comments. [Ref. 23:1] 
On 25 October 1993, SUPSHIP San Diego sent another letter to the SDSRA GCA 
Subcommittee, which advised that no comments or feedback were received from SDSRA 
members in response to the SUP SHIP San Diego letter of 14 July 1993. As such, this 
second letter provided the "over and above work" provisions that SUPSHIP San Diego 
intended to incorporate as a test into solicitation N62791-94-B-0018 for the ELLIOT 
fiscal year (FY) 1994 SRA. [Ref. 24: 1] 
E. DODIG AUDIT OF CONTROL OF "OVER AND ABOVE 
WORK" 
The DODIG reviewed eight maintenance, repair, and overhaul contracts which 
included "over and above work." The contracts included Army, Navy, and Air Force 
procurements and covered aviation, ship, and ground systems. The DODIG audit 
objective was to determine the effectiveness of the management of "over and above 
work" clauses in weapon systems repair and overhaul contracts. [Ref. 6:2] 
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The DODIG reviewed the Military Departments' and Defense Logistics Agency's 
(DLA's) guidance on managing "over and above work" clauses in weapon systems repair 
and overhaul contracts to determine if the applicable policies and procedures for 
controlling "over and above work" were effective. [Ref. 6:3] 
The DODIG reviewed the effectiveness of the Government and contractor 
practices and procedures for requesting, processing, and approving "over and above 
work" requests during FY 1991 for eight judgmentally selected repair and overhaul 
contracts. There were 43,579 "over and above work" requests valued at $50.8 million 
submitted by the contractors during FY 1991 for these eight contracts reviewed. The 
DODIG statistically selected 545 "over and above work" requests valued at $3.4 million 
for review. The DODIG reviewed the labor hours only. [Ref. 6:3] 
The DODIG evaluated the internal controls established by the Military 
Departments and the DLA for processing and approving "over and above work" requests. 
For the eight contracts reviewed, the internal controls were deemed to be effective since 
no material deficiencies were disclosed by the audit. [Ref. 6:4] 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of the "over and above work" concept and 
identified how the MSC and selected SUPSHIP offices address "over and above work." 
This chapter also presented SUPSHIP San Diego's efforts to facilitate the start of growth 
work and D & D negotiations by incorporating "over and above work" provisions as a 
test into the ELLIOT SRA solicitation. In addition, this chapter presented the DODIG 
finding that the management of "over and above work" clauses in weapon systems repair 
and overhaul contracts has been effective. The next chapter presents data on the amount 
and impact of "over and above work" in ship repair contracts. 
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III. EXTENT OF "OVER AND ABOVE WORK" 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide data on the amount and impact of "over 
and above work." or growth work, in ship repair contracts. This chapter presents the 
findings of two General Accounting Office (GAO) reports to the Congress on cost gro\V1h 
and schedule overruns at shipyards. In addition, this chapter presents Government 
estimate, contract award price, final contract cost, and growth work data collected by 
SUPSHIP San Diego for selected CNO availabilities in San Diego from FY 1985 to FY 
1994. Also, this chapter presents data on the extent "over and above work" has been 
discovered during the performance of FY 1994 ship repair contracts awarded by other 
SUPSHIP offices. 
B. GAO REPORTS ON COST GROWTH AND SCHEDULE 
OVERRUNS AT SHIPYARDS 
In a 1986 report to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the GAO reviewed the 
estimated and actual cost to overhaul Navy ships at private shipyards. The GAO obtained 
information on the 105 regular ship overhauls performed in private shipyards from FY 
1982 through May 1985. The GAO compared contract award amounts, Government 
estimates, and final contract prices, reviewed selected contract modifications and 
ascertained their effects on contract costs, and contrasted the size of price increases in the 
fixed-price contracts with those in the cost-type contracts. [Ref. 9: 1] 
The GAO found that overhaul costs increased significantly between the time of 
contract award and the time of contract completion. Such increases occurred under each 
ofthe 105 contracts, which consisted of seventy-five fixed-price contracts and thirty cost-
type contracts. On the seventy-five fixed-price contracts, the prices increased from $594 
million to $967 million, a difference of $3 73 million, or sixty-three percent. On the thirty 
cost-type contracts, the prices increased from $539 million to $728 million, a difference 
of $189 million, or thirty-five percent. [Ref. 9:1] 
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The GAO also found that seventy-one of the seventy-tive fixed-price contracts 
and twenty-four of the thirty cost-type contracts were a\varded at prices below the 
Government estimates. These differences averaged thirty-one percent and twenty-one 
percent, respectively. [Ref. 9:1] 
The increases in contract costs between award and completion were the result of 
modifications for growth work and new work. According to the Navy, gro\\<th work 
accounted for seventy-six percent and new work accounted for twenty-four percent of the 
cost increases on tixed-price contracts. On cost-type contracts, growth work amounted to 
sixty-six percent and new work thirty-four percent. [Ref. 9:1 and 8] 
The GAO analyzed selected modifications for twenty-five tixed-price contracts 
and found, in contrast to the experience on initial awards, that the Navy paid more than 
the Government· estimated that these modifications should cost. The GAO analysis 
showed that the tinal negotiated prices averaged twenty-seven percent more than the 
Government estimates. Navy officials stated that the higher prices were the result of 
negotiating on a sole-source basis with the original contractor rather than negotiating 
competitively, allowing premium pay for overtime and weekend work to meet scheduled 
completion dates, and reimbursing the contractor for the costs of D & D caused by 
modifications. [Ref. 9:2 and 8] 
In a 1990 report to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, the 
GAO reviewed the costs to overhaul and repair Navy ships at public and private 
shipyards and determined the extent and causes of cost growth and schedule overruns at 
the shipyards. The GAO compared contract award prices with final contract prices for 
maintenance work on 402 ships, which was completed at private shipyards between FY 
1985 and FY 1988. The GAO found that the contract costs increased from $2.8 billion to 
$3.7 billion, a difference of about thirty percent. The final prices exceeded the award 
prices on 357 ofthe 402 contracts. [Ref. 10:1-3] 
The GAO also compared initial Government estimates with actual costs at 
completion of maintenance work on 238 ships at public shipyards during the same period. 
The costs increased from $8.4 billion to $8.7 billion, a difference of about three percent. 
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This figure IS not fully comparable to the growth at private shipyards because 
Government estimates for work at public shipyards generally include a ten-percent 
grmvth factor not included in the contract award prices for private shipyards. [Ref. 1 0:3] 
Originally scheduled completion dates frequently were exceeded. At the private 
shipyards. work on 169 of 453 ships, or thirty-seven percent, overran the original 
schedules by an average of forty-three days. The overruns ranged from one day to 259 
days, with sixty-nine ships exceeding thirty days. The number and percentage of ships 
with schedule overruns increased each FY. At the public shipyards, work on 129 of 238 
ships, or fifty-four percent, overran the original schedules by an average of eighty-one 
days. The overruns ranged from one day to 526 days, with seventy-one ships exceeding 
thirty days. The number and percentage of ships with schedule overruns also increased 
eachFY. [Ref. 10:3 and 14] 
Many factors contributed to the cost growth and schedule overruns. In the private 
sector, the highly competitive market for Navy ship maintenance and modernization work 
has caused contractors to submit low price proposals to obtain the Navy work. 
Contractor bids are influenced by competition and do not include factors for cost growth. 
The market for Navy ship maintenance and modernization work is very competitive 
because no commercial ships are being built and little commercial ship repair work is 
being performed in the United States. Private shipyards have more capacity than the 
Navy needs and contractors tend to submit low price proposals to obtain the Navy work. 
Some Navy officials told the GAO that contractors later take every opportunity to 
increase the price after the contract is awarded. According to these Navy officials and 
industry experts, contractors routinely "low-ball" the Navy in the expectation of "getting 
well" on contract modifications. [Ref. 10:3 and 15] 
According to the 1990 GAO report to the House of Representatives Armed 
Services Committee, current laws and regulations provide no basis to exclude an 
otherwise technically acceptable, responsible contractor from a competition solely on the 
basis that the contractor submitted an excessively low contract price proposal. If it can be 
determined that the contractor can sustain the loss and is otherwise responsible. the Navy 
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must award the contract. The regulations, however, caution the Contracting Officer to 
take appropriate action to ensure that losses are not recovered by the contractor through 
the pricing of change orders or follow-on contracts. [Ref. 10: 15-16] 
Data compiled by the Shipbuilders Council of America indicate that the United 
States shipbuilding and ship repair industry is almost totally dependent on the 
Government for ship construction and ship repair work. For example, in 1987 about 
ninety-five percent of the private industry's work was dedicated to Government orders. 
The Council reports that many private shipyards are going out of business and that, 
between October 1982 and the end of 1987, forty-one shipyards closed and 32,000 
production workers lost their jobs. [Ref. 10:16] 
Because competition is intense for the limited amount of Government work, the 
Navy is receiving favorable contract award prices. Contract award prices on the 453 
ships awarded between 1985 and 1988 averaged twenty-two percent below the estimates 
the Navy had developed for budget projections and comparative purposes before awards. 
However, subsequent contract modifications more than offset this difference. [Ref. I 0: 16] 
The amount of labor and material required to do a modification is negotiated and a 
forward pricing rate and a profit factor are applied. The forward pricing rate is based on a 
contractor's experienced costs and' is audited by the DCAA and approved by the 
SUPSHIP office. Because a profit factor is applied, the more contract modifications, the 
more opportunities a contractor has to recover from the effect of a low-ball bid. 
According to Navy officials, the more competition favorably influences a contract award 
price, the more incentive a contractor has to find a need for contract modifications and to 
be uncompromising in negotiating the price of modifications. [Ref. I 0: 16] 
Other reasons for the schedule delays and the cost increases at private shipyards 
include the inability to determine exact maintenance requirements beforehand, poorly 
defined work packages, inadequate and late government furnished information, problems 
in obtaining materials, Government-caused D & D, and unplanned work added after 
contract award. Other factors include weather, labor strikes, late discovery of material 
deficiencies, poor contractor quality controls, and award of contracts to small, marginally 
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qualified ship repair contractors that take on large, complex repair jobs and experience 
tremendous learning curves. [Ref. 10:3 and 18] 
At the public shipyards, some of the reasons for the delays and increased costs 
were similar to those in the private sector. The conditions of the ships were not 
adequately known beforehand, work packages were poorly defined, problems were 
encountered in obtaining materials, and unplanned work was subsequently added. In 
addition, labor resources sometimes were insufficient to execute the work load properly. 
Also, since 1985 the Navy has placed more emphasis on cost control and less on schedule 
adherence. As a result, the percentage of ships meeting scheduled completion dates in 
public shipyards decreased to thirty-three percent in FY 1988. [Ref. 10:4] 
The Navy has been able to absorb the cost growth for work done by both private 
and public shipyards within approved budgets because the budgets are based on historical 
costs for similar ships rather than on contract award prices in private shipyards or initial 
Government estimates in public shipyards. Also, whenever cost growth becomes 
apparent, the Navy makes program decisions to adjust work packages of other ships 
scheduled for future maintenance and modernization to bring the total program back into 
balance. [Ref. 1 0: 13] 
C. SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO FY 1985 TO FY 1994 GROWTH WORK 
DATA 
Since FY 1985, SUPSHIP San Diego has collected Government estimate, contract 
award price, final contract cost, and growth work data for selected CNO availabilities in 
San Diego. The data, which are provided as Appendix F, are available as a FY total and 
as a FY average for each FY from FY 1985 to FY 1994. [Ref. 18] 
The Government estimates for the eleven FY 1985 contracts reviewed total 
$106,841,489, for an average contract Government estimate of$9,712,863. The contract 
award prices for these eleven FY 1985 contracts total $50,085,748, for an average 
contract award price of $4,553,250. The Government estimates for the eleven FY 1985 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $56,7 55,7 41, or by an average of 
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$5.159,613 per contract. The ratio of average contract award pnce to Government 
estimate is forty-seven percent, which means the FY 1985 average contract award price is 
fifty-three percent under the Government estimate. The final contract costs for the eleven 
FY 1985 contracts total $99,911,776, for an average final contract cost of$9,082,889. 
The final contract costs for the eleven FY 1985 contracts exceed the contract award prices 
by a total of $49,826,028, or by an average of $4,529,639 per contract. Thus, growth 
work averages ninety-nine percent above the contract award price for the eleven FY 1985 
contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Government estimates for the twelve FY 1986 contracts reviewed total 
$42,070,346, for an average contract Government estimate of $3,505,862. The contract 
award prices for these twelve FY 1986 contracts total $25,752,989, for an average 
contract award price of $2,146,082. The Government estimates for the twelve FY 1986 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $16,317,357, or by an average of 
$1,359,780 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to Government 
estimate is sixty-one percent, which means the FY 1986 average contract award price is 
thirty-nine percent under the Government estimate. The final contract costs for the 
twelve FY 1986 contracts total $30,086,636, for an average final contract cost of 
$2,507,220. The final contract costs for the twelve FY 1986 contracts exceed the contract 
award prices by a total of $4,333,647, or by an average of $361,137 per contract. Thus, 
growth work averages seventeen percent above the contract award price for the twelve 
FY 1986 contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Government estimates for the twenty-six FY 1987 contracts reviewed total 
$84,453,422, for an average contract Government estimate of $3,248,209. The contract 
award prices for these twenty-six FY 1987 contracts total $75,706,816, for an average 
contract award price of $2,911,801. The Government estimates for the twenty-six FY 
1987 contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $8,746,606, or by an 
average of $336,408 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to 
Government estimate is ninety percent, which means the FY 1987 average contract award 
price is ten percent under the Government estimate. The final contract costs for the 
twenty-six FY 1987 contracts total $88,801,959, for an average final contract cost of 
$3.415,469. The final contract costs for the twenty-six FY 1987 contracts exceed the 
contract award prices by a total of $13,095,143, or by an average of $503,659 per 
contract. Thus, growth work averages seventeen percent above the contract award price 
for the twenty-six FY 1987 contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Government estimates for the sixteen FY 1988 contracts reviewed total 
$54,136,076, for an average contract Government estimate of$3,383,505. The contract 
award prices for these sixteen FY 1988 contracts total $49,328,716, for an average 
contract award price of $3,083,045. The Government estimates for the sixteen FY 1988 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $4,807,360, or by an average of 
$300.460 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to Government estimate 
is ninety-one percent, which means the FY 1988 average contract award price is nine 
percent under the Government estimate. The final contract costs for the sixteen FY 1988 
contracts total $63,482,902, for an average final contract cost of $3,967,681. The final 
contract costs for the sixteen FY 1988 contracts exceed the contract award prices by a 
total of $14,064,236, or by an average of $879,015 per contract. Thus, growth work 
averages twenty-nine percent above the contract award price for the sixteen FY 1988 
contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Government estimates for the nineteen FY 1989 contracts reviewed total 
$66,93 L598, for an average contract Government estimate of $3,522,716. The contract 
award prices for these nineteen FY 1989 contracts total $62,186,181, for an average 
contract award price of $3,272,957. The Government estimates for the nineteen FY 1989 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $4,745,417, or by an average of 
$249,759 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to Government estimate 
is ninety-three percent, which means the FY 1989 average contract award price is seven 
percent under the Government estimate. The final contract costs for the nineteen FY 
1989 contracts total $81,431,296, for an average final contract cost of $4,285,858. The 
final contract costs for the nineteen FY 1989 contracts exceed the contract award prices 
by a total of $19.245,115. or by an average of $1.012,901 per contract. Thus. growth 
work averages thirty-one percent above the contract award price for the nineteen FY 1989 
contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Government estimates for the twenty-two FY 1990 contracts reviewed total 
$81,859.546, for an average contract Government estimate of $3,720,888. The contract 
award prices for these twenty-two FY 1990 contracts total $71,378,608, for an average 
contract award price of $3,244,482. The Government estimates for the twenty-two FY 
1990 contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $10,480,93 8, or by an 
average of $476,406 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to 
Government estimate is eighty-seven percent, which means the FY 1990 average contract 
award price is thirteen percent under the Government estimate. The final contract costs 
for the twenty-two FY 1990 contracts total $88,795,724, for an average final contract cost 
of $4,036,169. The final contract costs for the twenty-two FY 1990 contracts exceed the 
contract award prices by a total of $17,417,116, or by an average of $791,687 per 
contract. Thus, growth work averages twenty-four percent above the contract award price 
for the twenty-two FY 1990 contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Government estimates for the twenty-three FY 1991 contracts reviewed total 
$57,195,282, for an average contract Government estimate of $2,486,751. The contract 
award prices for these twenty-three FY 1991 contracts total $42,279,166, for an average 
contract award price of $1,83 8,225. The Government estimates for the twenty-three FY 
1991 contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $14,916,116, or by an 
average of $648,527 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to 
Government estimate is seventy-four percent, which means the FY 1991 average contract 
award price is twenty-six percent under the Government estimate. The final contract 
costs for the twenty-three FY 1991 contracts total $58,228,139, for an average final 
contract cost of $2,531,658. The final contract costs for the twenty-three FY 1991 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $15,948,973, or by an average of 
$693,434 per contract. Thus, growth work averages thirty-eight percent above the 
contract award price for the twenty-three FY 1991 contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
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The Govenunent estimates for the thirty-seven FY 1992 contracts reviewed total 
$144,194,710, for an average contract Govenunent estimate of$3,897,154. The contract 
award prices for these thirty-seven FY 1992 contracts total $108,257,971. for an average 
contract award price of $2,925,891. The Govenunent estimates for the thirty-seven FY 
1992 contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $35,936,739, or by an 
average of $971,263 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to 
Govenunent estimate is seventy-five percent, which means the FY 1992 average contract 
award price is twenty-five percent under the Govenunent estimate. The final contract 
costs for the thirty-seven FY 1992 contracts total $156,600,709, for an average final 
contract cost of $4,232,452. The final contract costs for the thirty-seven FY 1992 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $48,342,73 8, or by an average of 
$1,306,560 per contract. Thus, growth work averages forty-five percent above the 
contract award price for the thirty-seven FY 1992 contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Govenunent estimates for the thirteen FY 1993 contracts reviewed total 
$50,965,469, for an average contract Govenunent estimate of $3,920,421. The contract 
award prices for these thirteen FY 1993 contracts total $32,018,621, for an average 
contract award price of $2,462,971. The Govenunent estimates for the thirteen FY 1993 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $18,946,848, or by an average of 
$1,457,450 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to Govenunent 
estimate is sixty-three percent, which means the FY 1993 average contract award price is 
thirty-seven percent under the Govenunent estimate. The final contract costs for the 
thirteen FY 1993 contracts total $46,354,209, for an average final contract cost of 
$3,565,708. The final contract costs for the thirteen FY 1993 contracts exceed the 
contract award prices by a total of $14,335,588, or by an average of $1,102,738 per 
contract. Thus, growth work averages forty-five percent above the contract award price 
for the thirteen FY 1993 contracts reviewed. [Ref. 18] 
The Govenunent estimates for the twenty FY 1994 contracts reviewed total 
$69,646,587, for an average contract Govenunent estimate of $3,482,329. The contract 
award prices for these twenty FY 1994 contracts total $41,413,134. for an average 
contract award price of $2,070,657. The Government estimates for the twenty FY 1994 
contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of $28,233,453, or by an average of 
$1 A 11,673 per contract. The ratio of average contract award price to Government 
estimate is fifty-nine percent, which means the FY 1994 average contract award price is 
forty-one percent under the Government estimate. Data for FY 1994 are through August 
30, 1994, so final contract costs for the twenty FY 1994 contracts are not available. Thus, 
the percent of growth work above the contract award prices for the twenty FY 1994 
contracts reviewed is unknown. [Ref 18] 
Analysis of the data shows that the percentage of growth work above the contract 
award price dropped sharply from a high of ninety-nine percent in FY 1985 to a low of 
seventeen percent in FY 1986 and FY 1987. Growth work then steadily increased as a 
percentage above the contract award price during the next two FY s, nearly doubling to 
thirty-one percent in FY 1989. Growth work then decreased nearly twenty-five percent 
as a percentage above the contract award price to twenty-four percent the following FY. 
Growth work again then steadily increased as a percentage above the contract award price 
during the next two FYs, nearly doubling to forty-five percent in FY 1992. Growth work 
then remained the same percentage above the contract award price, forty-five percent, in 
FY 1993. 
Analysis of the data also shows that the ratio of average contract award price to 
Government estimate nearly doubled from a low of forty-seven percent in FY 1985 to 
ninety percent in FY 1987. The ratio of average contract award price to Government 
estimate remained above ninety percent the next two FY s, reaching a high of ninety-three 
percent in FY 1989. Since FY 1989, the ratio of average contract award price to 
Government estimate steadily decreased over thirty-three percent to fifty-nine percent in 
FY 1994. 
Analysis of the data also shows that the percentage of growth work above the 
contract award price was at a high of ninety-nine percent and that the ratio of average 
contract award price to Government estimate was at a low of forty-seven percent in the 
same FY. FY 1985. Since FY 1990, the percentage of growth work above the contract 
26 
award price steadily increased while, at the same time, the ratio of average contract award 
price to Government estimate steadily decreased. 
D. EXTENT OF "OVER AND ABOVE WORK" AT SELECTED 
SUPSHIP OFFICES 
The data presented in this section are from survey questionnaire responses 
received from selected SUPSHIP offices. As the data show, the extent of "over and 
above work" varies from one SUPSHIP office to another. 
One SUPSHIP office awarded twenty-six ship repair contracts m FY 1994. 
Contract award prices for these twenty-six contracts total $2,361,020, while current 
contract costs for these twenty -six contracts total $3, 181, 112. Thus, the current contract 
costs for these twenty-six contracts exceed the contract award prices by a total of 
$820,092. So this one SUPSHIP office is experiencing growth work of thirty-five percent 
above the contract award price. This SUPSHIP office responds that the impact of growth 
work on these ship repair contracts is minimal. Growth work is discovered early, 
normally within the first twenty-five percent of the contract performance schedule. This 
is an aggressive approach taken by the SUPSHIP administrative staff and the contractor 
to resolve problems early. For this one SUPSHIP office, the number of changes this year 
are not at a level to cause cumulative impact as a result of the synergistic effect of 
numerous changes to the basic contract work. 
Another SUPSHIP office awarded 205 ship repair contracts in FY 1994. Total 
contract award value is $58 million. The current contract costs for these 205 contracts 
exceed the contract award prices by over $16 million. So this one SUPSHIP office is 
experiencing growth work of twenty-eight percent above the contract award price. This 
SUPS HIP office responds that, typically, the impact of growth work on the contract 
schedule is not very great in the longer ship repair availabilities done in the contractor's 
plant. In the smaller jobs, done pierside at the Naval Station, there is usually a lot more 
growth work encountered and, therefore, more risk of delays in completing the work. 
The usual cause for the delay is simply the additional time required to perform the 
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additional work. Rarely is the contract schedule extended due to delays m 
administratively incorporating the growth work into the contract. 
Another SUPSHIP office awarded twelve ship repair contracts in FY 1994. This 
SUPSHIP office responds that there is little or no growth work being experienced on 
these twelve contracts and no impact to the contract schedules. Another SUPSHIP office 
awarded twenty ship repair contracts in FY 1994. This SUPSHIP office responds that 
some overhauls are experiencing growth work as much as I 00 percent above the contract 
award price. The SUPSHIP office states that the contractors are managing to perform the 
growth work with minimal impact to the contract schedules. Another SUPSHIP office 
awarded thirty-one ship repair contracts in FY 1994. This SUPSHIP office responds that 
the current contract costs for these thirty-one contracts exceed the contract award prices 
by approximately $6,940,000. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the findings of two GAO reports to the Congress on cost 
growth and schedule overruns at shipyards. This chapter also presented Government 
estimate, contract award price, final contract cost, and growth work data collected by 
SUPSHIP San Diego for selected CNO availabilities in San Diego from FY 1985 to FY 
1994. In addition, this chapter presented data on the extent "over and above work," or 
growth work, has been discovered during the performance of FY 1994 ship repair 
contracts awarded by other SUPSHIP offices. The next chapter presents an analysis of 
the lessons learned and the positive and negative feedback from Government and 
contractor personnel involved with the local test incorporation of the DF ARS "over and 
above work" provisions in the ELLIOT SRA contract. 
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IV. A LOCAL TEST INCORPORATION OF THE "OVER AND 
ABOVE WORK" PROVISIONS IN A SHIP REPAIR CONTRACT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present how SUPSHIP San Diego incorporated 
the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions as a local test in the ELLIOT SRA 
contract. This chapter also presents the internal SUPSHIP San Diego "over and above 
work" procedures used during the ELLIOT SRA contract. This chapter identifies and 
provides an analysis of the test results, the lessons learned, and the positive and negative 
feedback from Government and contractor personnel involved with the ELLIOT SRA 
contract. In addition, this chapter provides an analysis of the "over and above work" 
concept and the issue of ship repair contractors recovering losses through contract 
modifications. 
B. ELLIOT SRA CONTRACT "OVER AND ABOVE WORK" 
PROVISIONS 
The ELLIOT SRA contract "over and above work" provisions are provided as 
Appendix G. The "over and above work" contract line item numbers (CLINs) in Section 
B of the ELLIOT SRA contract are for the purpose of covering work which is required to 
be performed under the basic CLINs of the contract but which is not included within the 
scope and firm-fixed prices of those basic CLINs. The contractor is tasked with 
identifying needed repairs and recommending corrective action during contract 
performance for those deficiencies discovered which are not covered by the basic contract 
or subsequent contract modifications. The contractor is to submit these needed repairs 
and recommended corrective actions to the Government in the form of an Inspection 
Deficiency Report (IDR), which is also known as a work request within the meaning of 
the DFARS "over and above work" clause at 252.217-7028. [Ref. 15:8] 
As a minimum, the IDR is to be serialized by IDR number, include the contract 
number, and identify the basic contract work item number that the needed repairs and 
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recommended corrective actions apply to. In addition, the IDR is to include a description 
of the deficiency discovered, the specific location of the deficiency, and a 
recommendation for corrective action. As an attachment to the IDR, the contractor is to 
submit an estimate of the direct labor hours, including any administrative time in direct 
support of the contract, overtime, double time, and D & D hours, subcontractor costs, and 
material costs required to correct the deficiency. However, if sufficient information is 
available, the contractor is to submit, as an attachment to the IDR, a proposal in the form 
of a Change Order Price Analysis (COPA) in sufficient detail with which to negotiate a 
FFP contract modification. The contractor is to indicate on the IDR whether the attached 
price information represents estimates or a COPA to be negotiated. The IDR is to also 
identify any related changes, if any, to the contract delivery schedule or internal milestone 
dates. [Ref. 15 :9] 
The contractor is not to split required work into several IDRs to avoid any given 
dollar threshold. To the maximum extent possible, all efforts are to be made to negotiate 
a FFP contract modification prior to the start of the "over and above work." Negotiations 
are to be conducted in accordance with established procedures. Failure to agree upon a 
reasonable price is to be considered a question of fact subject to the Disputes clause of the 
contract. [Ref. 15:1 0] 
The ACO is to initial all IDR responses which authorize the contractor to proceed 
with corrective action prior to the price being negotiated. The authorization, or order, is 
to include a dollar amount which represents the limitation of Government liability. 
Written authorization to proceed, which includes the limitation of Government liability, 
must be received by the contractor from the ACO before performance of the "over and 
above work" starts. [Ref. 15:10] 
The limitation of Government liability, which is the maximum amount that the 
Government will be obligated to pay the contractor for performance of the "over and 
above work" until the order is definitized, is to be that amount identified on the 
authorization for the contractor to proceed with performance. The contractor is not 
authorized to make expenditures or mcur obligations exceeding the limitation of 
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Government liability set forth in the authorization. If such expenditures are made, or if 
such obligations are incurred, they are at the contractor's sole risk and expense. In 
addition, the limitation of liability is the maximum Government liability if the order is 
terminated. [Ref. 15 :9] 
If at any time the contractor believes that its expenditures under an undefinitized 
"over and above work" authorization will exceed the limitation of Government liability, 
the contractor is to notify the Contracting Officer in writing and propose an appropriate 
increase in the limitation of Government liability for the authorization. Within five days 
of such notice, the Contracting Officer is to either notify the contractor in writing of the 
increase in the limitation of Government liability for the authorization or instruct the 
contractor how and to what extent the "over and above work" is to continue. However, in 
no event is the contractor obligated to proceed with "over and above work" on an 
undefinitized authorization beyond the point where its costs incurred plus a reasonable 
profit thereon exceed the limitation of Government liability. Also, in no event is the 
Government obligated to pay the contractor any amount in excess of the limitation of 
Government liability specified in any undefinitized authorization prior to establishment of 
firm prices. [Ref. 15 :9] 
Upon receipt of an IDR response initialed by the ACO but not yet negotiated, the 
contractor is to diligently proceed with performance of the "over and above work." 
Within ten days after the contractor receives notification to proceed with performance of 
"over and above work" for which a price has not been negotiated and for which the 
contractor has not submitted a COP A, or price proposal, for purposes of negotiation, the 
contractor is to submit to the Government a detailed COP A. The total proposed price of 
the COP A is not to exceed the estimate submitted with the IDR. The Contracting Officer 
may grant an extension of this ten day period if the contractor requests it within the ten 
day period. If the circumstances permit it, the Contracting Officer may accept and 
negotiate a COP A, or price proposal, at any later time prior to final payment under the 
contract, except that the contractor may not receive profit on a payment under a late 
request. [Ref. 15:8 and 10] 
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All "over and above work" authorized and performed is funded under CLINs 0004 
through 0006 in Section B of the contract. No invoices are to be submitted against 
CLINs 0004 through 0006 and CLINs 0004 through 0006 are not to be incorporated into 
the Work in Progress Report (WKP 500) for the purpose of calculating percentage of 
work completed. The WKP 500 is to always show zero progress for the "over and above 
work" CLINs. The work request proposals, or IDRs, and associated COPAs are to be 
negotiated and definitized by use of the Standard Form (SF) 30. This SF 30 is to transfer 
funding from, or decrease, CLINs 0004 through 0006 and to increase the appropriate 
CLIN in the basic contract for that work item. Following negotiation of the COPA and 
preparation of the contract modification SF 30, the Government is to update the WKP 500 
to reflect actual work performed as of the negotiation settlement date. At the end of 
contract performance and after all "over and above work" has been definitized, a bilateral 
SF 30 is to be prepared and executed, deobligating unused funding on the "over and 
above work" CLINs. [Ref. 15:10-11] 
The contractor is to segregate and track costs in accordance with the Change 
Order Accounting provisions of the contract. Any "over and above work" authorized to 
proceed prior t<? reaching agreement on a negotiated price, or which is not negotiated 
prior to completion of performance, is to be negotiated based on actual costs incurred. 
The actual incurred costs submitted by the contractor are subject to review and 
verification, as determined by the ACO, by the DCAA. [Ref. 15:10] 
C. INTERNAL SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO "OVER AND ABOVE 
WORK" PROCEDURES 
An "over and above work" pool of money is established by SUPSHIP Code 710, 
the Funds Administrator, for the purpose of committing funds, using SUPSHIP Form 
7302/12 (Commitment/Obligation/Expenditure), with the establishment of the "over and 
above work" CLIN. The contractor's IDR is submitted to the SUPSHIP Supervisory 
Surveyor, who logs the IDR in, removes the attached contractor COP A or estimate, and 
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passes the IDR to the appropriate SUPSHIP Surveyor for review and verification. [Ref. 
16:1] 
The SUPSHIP Surveyor reviews the IDR to validate that the noted deficiency is 
not covered by the contract and that the "over and above work" needs to be performed. 
The SUPSHIP Surveyor then develops an independent Government estimate for the 
required work and submits a recommendation to the SUPSHIP Supervisory Surveyor for 
action. One or more scoping conferences between the contractor and Government 
surveyor may be required to ensure that the "over and above work" to be performed is 
clearly understood by all parties. [Ref. 16: 1] 
The SUPSHIP Supervisory Surveyor matches the SUPSHIP Surveyor input with 
the contractor's COPA or estimate which was previously removed from the IDR, reviews 
and endorses the recommendation from the SUPSHIP Surveyor, and passes the 
recommendation to the SUPSHIP Project Manager for a decision on whether to proceed 
with the "over and above work." The SUPSHIP Project Manager also maintains a 
financial balance sheet for funding available under the "over and above work" CLIN. If 
the decision is to authorize the contractor to proceed with the "over and above work," an 
entry is made in the "over and above work" funding log, using the higher of the 
independent Government estimate or the estimate prepared by the contractor, to indicate 
the estimated value of the financial commitment. A running balance in this log is 
maintained. No "over and above work" is authorized if insufficient funds are available on 
the "over and above work" CLIN to cover the potential Government liability. [Ref. 16: 1] 
The SUPSHIP Project Manager then initials the authorization, annotates the 
authorization with "Limitation of Government Liability is $ ," filling in the blank 
using the lower of the independent Government estimate or the estimate prepared by the 
contractor, and has the SUPSHIP ACO initial all "over and above work" authorizations 
which require the contractor to begin work prior to definitizing the price for that effort. 
Upon receipt of the contractor's COPA, negotiations are conducted in accordance with 
established procedures. Once negotiated, the SUPSHIP ACO initiates action to obligate 
funds by notifying SUPSHIP Code 710. using SUPSHIP Form 7302/12, to de-commit the 
,.,,., 
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"over and above work" CLIN and obligate the definitized or negotiated price. [Ref. 16:1-
2] 
The SUPSHIP ACO then distributes signed copies of SF 30s to the SUPSHIP 
Project Manager, who updates the "over and above work" funding log with definitized 
prices. In addition, the SUPSHIP Project Manager takes action to ensure the WKP 500 is 
updated to reflect the new contract value and amount of work, labor and material, 
performed by the contractor as of the negotiation settlement date. When the SUPSHIP 
Project Manager projects that future "over and above work" will exceed the remaining 
"over and above work" funds available, the SUPSHIP Project Manager initiates a request 
for additional funds to increase the value of the "over and above work" CLIN. [Ref. 16:2] 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE ELLIOT SRA LOCAL TEST 
Data resulting from the ELLIOT SRA local test are provided as Appendix H. 
Included in Appendix H are data from the USS COPELAND (FFG-25) SRA and the USS 
RENTZ (FFG-46) Dry dock Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA). All three ships 
were in FFP availabilities at SWM during the same time period. Only the ELLIOT SRA 
contract contained the "over and above work" provisions. 
The ratio of IDRs submitted by SWM to modifications issued by SUPSHIP San 
Diego was 3.9:1 for the ELLIOT SRA, compared to 5.7:1 for the COPELAND SRA and 
7.4:1 for the RENTZ DSRA. The number of modifications issued was seventy-two for 
the ELLIOT SRA, fifty-seven for the COPELAND SRA, and ninety-one for the RENTZ 
DSRA. Multiplying the number of modifications issued by the ratio of IDRs to 
modifications indicates that the number of IDRs submitted by SWM was 281 for the 
ELLIOT SRA, 325 for the COPELAND SRA, and 673 for the RENTZ DSRA. The 
average number of days from IDR receipt by SUPSHIP San Diego to negotiated 
modification was 2.5 for the ELLIOT SRA, 12.3 for the COPELAND SRA, and 14.9 for 
the RENTZ DSRA. 
The identification of growth to settlement was much quicker during the ELLIOT 
SRA contract compared to the other contracts not having the "over and above work" 
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provisiOns. This proved highly successful as the ELLIOT SRA contract experienced 
almost 100 percent growth during an initial availability of less than two months. The 
ELLIOT SRA contract award price was $1,099,895 while the contract experienced 
$1,040,000 in growth work. Contract extensions were not due to an inability to settle, but 
rather, to circumstances beyond the control of either SWM or SUPSHIP San Diego. The 
contract extensions were due mainly to late arriving material for the waste heat boilers 
and problems with the torpedo strike down system. [Ref. 8: 1] 
An apparent understanding by both SUPSHIP San Diego and SWM that the 
inability to reach settlement would benefit neither party contributed to the much lower 
average number of days from IDR receipt to negotiated modification. That is, SUPSHIP 
San Diego would have had to issue a unilateral change order, perhaps more than once; 
SWM would have had the added responsibility and additional costs associated with 
tracking costs; and an increase in correspondence and administrative effort would have 
been experienced by both parties had the issuance of unilaterals or the segregation and 
tracking of costs been necessary. SUPSHIP San Diego did not have to issue any 
unilateral change orders during the ELLIOT SRA since SWM and SUPSHIP San Diego 
were able to successfully negotiate all "over and above work" modifications. [Ref. 8:1] 
Perhaps there was a perception on the part of both SUPSHIP San Diego and SWM 
that non-settlement would lead to a "cost" scenario in which the Government perceives 
the contractor will get its costs, however great, and the contractor realized that costs 
incurred would exclude profit and be a long time in coming since the costs would have to 
be audited, etc. Whichever the case, if either is the case, the SUPSHIP San Diego ACO 
for the ELLIOT SRA contract believes neither party negotiated along the "hard line" but 
rather to the concept that it was in both parties' best interests to reach a settlement that 
was fair and reasonable as quickly as practicable. [Ref. 8: 1] 
The much lower average number of days from IDR receipt to negotiated 
modification could be explained by other reasons, such as the SUPSHIP San Diego 
project management code assigned, SWM's project team, the understandings obtained by 
the ACO between the parties prior to the start of the contract, the method of increasing 
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funding (via unilateral modification, which put SWM on notice as to the amount of funds 
available in the "over and above work" CLINs), the amount of growth work or "over and 
above work" issued assured SWM of making a profit, a perception of fair play and trust, 
etc. Whatever the case, the ELLIOT SRA contract proceeded with minimal 
disagreements between SWM and SUPSHIP San Diego. [Ref. 8:1] 
The "over and above work" provisions provided a vehicle for SWM to supply a 
COP A for each IDR that requested growth work. The SUPSHIP San Diego Project 
Manager for the ELLIOT SRA contract believes this was beneficial in that it reduced the 
number ofiDRs submitted by SWM and more clearly defined SWM's recommendation of 
additional repairs. [Ref. 11:1] 
Initially, the SUPSHIP San Diego ACO, Project Manager, Surveyors, etc. had a 
hard time with the change in routine as a result of incorporating the DFARS "over and 
above work" provisions into the ELLIOT SRA contract. But once they had time to think 
about and absorb the realities of the provisions, they realized the change was minimal and 
required very little adaptation to the normal way they did business. [Ref. 8:3] 
During the ELLIOT SRA, SWM experienced no significant problems with the use 
of the "over and above work" contract provisions. However, use of these provisions did 
cause SWM to experience a marked increase in clerical work in the Contracts 
Department. This SRA was a relatively short one, with a moderate amount of basic work. 
Had this been an extended SRA of several months, SWM most likely would have 
assigned additional personnel to handle the anticipated heavy change order request work 
load, which would increase the overhead cost. [Ref. 12: 1] 
All things considered, SWM's Senior Vice President for Contracts, Material, and 
Environmental felt that the use of the "over and above work" provisions in the ELLIOT 
SRA contract was beneficial to both parties. Its use served to enhance · the 
communications between the parties and invoked a steadier uninterrupted flow of work 
than usual on this type of contract. SWM believes that the key to the successful use of 
the "over and above work" provisions in the ELLIOT SRA contract, and any future 
contracts, is the ability of both parties to provide on-site staff personnel that can 
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communicate effectively, use reason at all times and work closely to resolve problems 
that may arise to the mutual benefit of both parties. [Ref. 12:2] 
Negative feedback from the SUPSHIP ACO included comments questioning the 
need to go out with a unilateral Supplemental Agreement to increase funding to the "over 
and above work" CLINs in Section B of the contract. The SUPSHIP ACO suggested 
increasing funding to the "over and above work" CLINs in Section B of the contract be 
done in-house SUPSHIP San Diego via a memo between Codes 600, 700, and 400 
without putting the contractor on notice that additional funding has been added to the 
"over and above work" CLINs. This would cut down on the number of administrative 
Supplemental Agreements issued. The SUPSHIP San Diego ACO stated that it is hard to 
believe that, if the contractor knows how much the "over and above work" CLIN funding 
is being increased by, the contractor will not go for all of the "over and above work" 
CLIN funding increase. In addition, the SUPSHIP San Diego ACO stated that it is hard 
to believe that the contractor does not realize the "over and above work" CLIN funding 
increase is due to a growth modification or that it does not influence the contractor's 
estimating or negotiating. Also, the SUPSHIP San Diego ACO questioned the internal 
SUPSHIP San Diego procedures used to notify the SUPSHIP San Diego accounting 
technician of increases or deceases to the basic contract package and "over and above 
work" CLINs. [Ref. 8:2] 
Perhaps the single most notable effect of incorporating the DF ARS "over and 
above work" provisions into the ELLIOT SRA contract is the significant decrease in the 
amount of time it takes from the submittal of the IDR by the contractor to the issuance of 
a modification by the Government. In previous contracts, it took two weeks to a month 
from the time the contractor submitted the IDR to the time the modification was 
negotiated. In the ELLIOT SRA contract, it took only a couple of days from the time 
SWM submitted the IDR to the time the modification was negotiated. One interviewee 
stated that it was possible to review the IDR and COPA, get an independent Government 
estimate, and negotiate a settlement with the contractor in one day. Another interviewee 
acknowledged that, in previous contracts, some growth work or "over and above work" 
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started before the ACO authorized the contractor to proceed or before the modification 
was issued so that the work could be completed by the contract schedule completion date, 
since it usually took thirty days or so from the time the contractor submitted the IDR to 
the time the modification was negotiated. Since it took two or three days from the time 
SWM submitted the IDR to the time the modification was negotiated in the ELLIOT SRA 
contract, it appears that the incorporation of the DF ARS "over and above work" 
provisions into ship repair contracts can significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the amount 
of "unauthorized" growth work or "over and above work." These are tremendous benefits 
as a result of incorporating the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into ship repair 
contracts. 
However, incorporating the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into the 
ELLIOT SRA contract on a fixed-price basis, where the basic work and the "over and 
above work" were fixed-price, did not completely address the original issue SUPSHIP 
San Diego is trying to resolve, which is finding a tool that facilitates D & D negotiations. 
Although the time from submittal of the IDR by the contractor to negotiation of the 
modification was reduced significantly, the COPA submitted by SWM included D & D as 
a cost element in the "over and above work" price proposal. Thus, D & D continued to be 
a proposal cost element that needed to be negotiated in order for the Government and the 
contractor to successfully negotiate the "over and above work" modification. 
One of the major reasons why SUPS HIP San Diego and SWM did not experience 
any significant problems with the incorporation of the DF ARS "over and above work" 
provisions into the ELLIOT SRA contract is that there was a good working relationship 
between the Government and contractor personnel involved with the daily administration 
of the contract. It would be interesting to see how the use of the DFARS "over and above 
work" provisions in a ship repair contract would tum out if the Government 'and 
contractor personnel involved with the daily administration of the contract did not have a 
good working relationship and could not successfully negotiate the "over and above 
work" modifications. 
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Interested parties involved in ship repair contracts are cautioned, however, that, 
just because the incorporation of the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into the 
ELLIOT SRA contract went well, assessing the value of incorporating the DF ARS "over 
and above work" provisions into ship repair contracts after just one local test may result 
in a limited and less than accurate assessment. Interested parties involved in ship repair 
contracts need to be aware that there may be difficulties, impediments, and issues not 
discovered or realized in this first local test of incorporating the DFARS "over and above 
work" provisions into a ship repair contract. The second SUPSHIP San Diego local test 
incorporation of the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into the USS PELELIU 
(LHA-5) SRA contract currently being performed at SWM will provide additional 
information that should be useful in assessing the value of incorporating the DF ARS 
"over and above work" provisions into ship repair contracts. 
Looking at the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions as a whole, there is 
little difference in approach, principle, or manner to the way other fixed-price ship repair 
contracts are administered. The researcher notes, however, that the mere suggestion of 
doing something different than the usual way of doing things tends to generate resistance, 
which hinders acceptance and turns something simple into something difficult. 
E. ANALYSIS OF THE "OVER AND ABOVE WORK" CONCEPT 
AND THE ISSUE OF SHIP REPAIR CONTRACTORS 
RECOVERING LOSSES THROUGH CONTRACT 
MODIFICATIONS 
The 1990 GAO report to the House of Representatives Armed Services 
Committee stated that the laws and regulations at that time provided no basis to exclude 
an otherwise technically acceptable, responsible contractor from a competition solely on 
the basis that the contractor submitted an excessively low contract price proposal. The 
1990 GAO report also stated that, if it can be determined that the contractor can sustain 
the loss and is otherwise responsible, the Navy must award the ship repair contract. The 
1990 GAO report stated, however, that the regulations caution the Contracting Officer to 
take appropriate action to ensure that losses on FFP ship repair contracts are not 
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recovered by the contractor through the pncmg of change orders or contract 
modifications. 
The DF ARS "over and above work" provlSlons are a tool available for the 
Contracting Officer to use to help ensure that contractors do not recover losses as a result 
of submitting excessively low FFP ship repair contract bids. Incorporating the DF ARS 
"over and above work" provisions into ship repair contracts, where the "over and above 
work" contract line item is cost-reimbursable with no fee, will help ensure that the 
contractor does not recover losses on the FFP basic contract package through the pricing 
of "over and above work." With the "over and above work" cost-reimbursable with no 
fee for the contractor, the contractor will only be reimbursed for the allowable, 
reasonable, and allocable costs incurred in performing the "over and above work." Thus, 
the contractor will not be able to receive any fee on the "over and above work" to offset 
the losses incurred as a result of a low-ball FFP bid on the basic contract package. This 
will force the contractor to submit more realistic FFP ship repair contract bids. This may 
also keep the contractor from searching for every possible need for "over and above 
work" in order to get well. Thus, the contractor will only propose "over and above work" 
that is truly needed in order to complete the contract. As a result, the cost growth and 
schedule overruns experienced by ship repair contracts will be reduced. 
If the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions had been incorporated into the 
ELLIOT SRA contract with the "over and above work" contract line item cost-
reimbursable with no fee and the basic package fixed-price, SWM and the other offerors 
may have submitted higher bids for the contract. Contractors are motivated by profit. 
Thus, SWM and the other offerors would normally submit more realistic bids for the 
contract since they would not receive any fee to offset the losses incurred as a result of a 
low-ball FFP bid on the basic contract package. 
However, it is possible that SWM and the other offerors would not have changed 
their bids for the contract since this would have been the first "hybrid" contract awarded 
by SUPSHIP San Diego and if SWM and the other offerors believed that they could 
sustain the losses that might be incurred on the contract. But since contractors need to 
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make profits in the long-run in order to stay in business and to satisfy shareholders, SWM 
and the other offerors would eventually have to start submitting more realistic FFP bids 
instead of low-ball FFP bids for ship repair contracts. 
There is an issue that Contracting Officers may need to address in the future if a 
"hybrid" contract type, with the "over and above work" contract line item cost-
reimbursable with no fee and the basic package fixed-price, is used to incorporate the 
DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into ship repair contracts. Contractors may 
not be willing to submit bids for a ship repair contract if the amount of "over and above 
work," or growth work, being experienced on contracts is a significant percentage of the 
amount of the basic package work. Since contractors would receive no fee on the "over 
and above work," contractors would realize a lower profit rate on the total contract work 
because the amount of profit received would not increase as the amount of total contract 
work increased. Contractors and their shareholders usually have a minimum return on 
investment threshold that is expected to be achieved. Thus, Contracting Officers may 
need to be prepared to somehow address the issue of contractors receiving lower realized 
profit rates on the total contract work if the amount of "over and above work" 
experienced on ship repair contracts is a significant percentage of the amount of the basic 
package work. 
In addition, contractors may start challenging that the "over and above work" is 
not growth work, but instead is new work, which the contractors would argue should be 
added to the basic contract on a FFP basis with profit. This may result in increased 
· disputes and litigation between the contractors and the Government, resulting in increased 
workload, delayed contract closeout, and a deteriorated working relationship between the 
contractors and the Government. 
One SWM interviewee stated that there is a much better working relationship 
between SWM and SUPSHIP San Diego contract administration personnel, including 
surveyors, on their cost type phased maintenance contracts, which are not under the FFP 
MSRA requirements, than with the FFP MSRA ship repair contracts. The interviewee 
stated that there is much less antagonism in negotiating modifications to these cost type 
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phased maintenance contracts. One reason why there would be less antagonism, 
especially on SWM's part, is that the Government assumes the risk of contracts and 
SWM is assured of being reimbursed for the allowable, reasonable, and allocable costs 
incurred in performing the contract work plus fee. Thus, there may be less antagonism in 
negotiating modifications for "over and above work" if a "hybrid" contract type was used 
to incorporate the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into the MSRA ship repair 
contracts. 
Using a "hybrid" contract type, with the "over and above work" contract line item 
cost-reimbursable with no fee and the basic package fixed-price, to incorporate the 
DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into the ELLIOT SRA contract would not 
have changed the administrative procedures used to implement the "over and above 
work" provisions nor the results of the contract. The contractor would still have 
identified needed repairs and recommended corrective action by submitting IDRs. The 
contractor would still have submitted COPAs with which to negotiate cost-reimbursement 
with no fee contract modifications. Thus, the use of the administrative procedures to 
implement the "over and above work" provisions would still have resulted in a significant 
decrease in the amount of time it takes from the submittal of the IDR by the contractor to 
the issuance of a modification by the Government. 
In addition, the contractor would have been able to segregate and track costs 
between the fixed-price work and the cost type work since the contractor already uses an 
accounting system to track cost on its cost type phased maintenance contracts. However, 
the use of a "hybrid" contract type would have extended contract closeout since the actual 
incurred "over and above work" costs submitted by the contractor would have been 
subject to review and verification by the DCAA. 
Incorporating the DF ARS "over and above work" provlSlons into ship repair 
contracts on a fixed-price basis will not help ensure that the contractor does not recover 
losses on the FFP basic contract package through the pricing of "over and above work." 
With the "over and above work" fixed-price, the contractor will be paid a negotiated 
amount for the "over and above work" to be performed. The negotiated amount will be 
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for estimated labor, material, overhead, subcontractor, and other direct costs and will also 
include profit for the "over and above work." Thus, the contractor will be able to receive 
profit on the "over and above work" to offset the losses incurred as a result of a low-ball 
FFP bid on the basic contract package. This will not force the contractor to submit more 
realistic FFP ship repair contract bids. This will incentivize the contractor to find every 
possible need for "over and above work" and to be uncompromising in negotiating the 
FFP of the "over and above work" in order to get well. As a result, ship repair contracts 
will continue to experience cost growth and schedule overruns. 
Since DFARS 217.7101(b) defines MSRA contracts as fixed-price, incorporating 
the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions into ship repair contracts, with the "over 
and above work" contract line item cost-reimbursable with no fee, will require that a 
deviation be processed through the DAR Council to incorporate cost type language into 
the agreements. Processing a deviation through the DAR Council should be done if using 
a "hybrid" contract type, with the basic package solicited and awarded fixed-price and the 
"over and above work" contract line item cost-reimbursable with no fee, makes sense. 
The analysis of the local test incorporation of the DF ARS "over and above work" 
provisions into the ELLIOT SRA contract and the analysis of the "over and above work" 
concept and the issue of ship repair contractors recovering losses through contract 
modifications indicate that using a "hybrid" contract type makes sense, at least enough 
sense to allow SUPSHIP San Diego to use a "hybrid" contract type in a local test 
incorporation ofthe DFARS "over and above work" provisions. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented how SUPSHIP San Diego incorporated the DF ARS "over 
and above work" provisions as a local test in the ELLIOT SRA contract. This chapter 
also presented the internal SUPSHIP San Diego "over and above work" procedures used 
during the ELLIOT SRA contract. This chapter identified and provided an analysis of the 
test results, the lessons learned, and the positive and negative feedback from Government 
and contractor personnel involved with the ELLIOT SRA contract. In addition, this 
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chapter provided an analysis of the "over and above work" concept and the issue of ship 
repair contractors recovering losses through contract modifications. The next chapter 
presents the conclusions and recommendations ofthis thesis. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions and recommendations of 
this thesis. This chapter also presents brief answers to the research questions. In 
addition, this chapter identifies suggested areas for further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
(1) Based on the local test results of the ELLIOT SRA contract, it appears that the 
incorporation of the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions can be an effective 
method to negotiate modifications in the acquisition of "over and above work" in ship 
repair contracts. The single most notable effect of incorporating the DF ARS "over and 
above work" provisions in the ELLIOT SRA contract was the significant decrease in the 
time it took from the submittal of the IDR to the issuance of the modification. However, 
one needs to keep in mind that this was just one local test ofthe DFARS "over and above 
work" provisions in a ship repair contract and that both parties were able to work closely 
and effectively together. Incorporating the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions 
into ship repair contracts may not necessarily, therefore, be for all SUPSHIP offices an 
effective method to negotiate "over and above work" modifications. 
(2) Any problems with the use of the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions 
encountered during the ELLIOT SRA contract were minor in nature and, with continued 
use of these provisions, should be easily resolved. Both SUP SHIP San Diego and SWM 
can benefit from this local test and can be better prepared to ensure the successful 
completion of future ship repair contracts which incorporate the DFARS "over and above 
work" provisions. 
(3) When the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions are looked at as a whole, 
there is very little difference in approach, principle, or manner to the way any other fixed-
price ship repair contract is administered. However, the suggestion of doing something 
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different than the usual way of doing business tends to generate resistance, which 
hampers acceptance and can turn something simple into something difficult. 
(4) Incorporating the DFARS "over and above work" provisions into the ELLIOT 
SRA contract on a fixed-price basis did not completely resolve the issue of SUPSHIP San 
Diego finding a tool that facilitates D & D negotiations. Although the time from 
submittal of the IDR by SWM to negotiation of the modification was reduced 
significantly, D & D continued to be a proposal cost element that needed to be negotiated 
in order for SUPSHIP San Diego and SWM to successfully negotiate the "over and above 
work" modification. 
(5) Using a "hybrid" contract type to incorporate the DF ARS "over and above 
work" provisions into ship repair contracts, with the basic contract package solicited and 
awarded fixed-price and the "over and above work" contract line item cost-reimbursable 
with no fee, will help Contracting Officers ensure that contractors do not recover losses 
on FFP contracts through the pricing of change orders or contract modifications. 
Contractors will only be reimbursed for the allowable, reasonable, and allocable costs 
incurred in performing the "over and above work." Contractors will not be able to receive 
any fee on the "over and above work" to offset the losses incurred as a result of a low-ball 
FFP bid on the basic contract package. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) SUPS HIP San Diego incorporate the lessons learned from the local test results 
ofthe ELLIOT SRA and the PELELIU SRA contracts in future ship repair contracts that 
incorporate the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions. 
(2) SUPSHIP San Diego hold meetings after future contract awards between the 
SUPSHIP ACO, the SUPSHIP Project Management team, and the contractor's project 
management and contracting personnel to enable the SUPSHIP ACO to explain and 
clarify the contract's "over and above work" provisions. 
(3) SUPSHIP San Diego inform NA VSEA 028 and all of the other SUPSHIP 
offices of the local test results, lessons learned, and positive and negative feedback from 
46 
Government and contractor personnel involved with the ELLIOT SRA and the PELELIU 
SRA contracts. 
(4) NAVSEA 028, with the local test results of the ELLIOT SRA and the 
PELELIU SRA contracts in hand, request and obtain a deviation from the DAR Council 
to incorporate cost type language into the MSRAs. 
(5) NA VSEA 028 allow local testing of a "hybrid" contract type, with the basic 
contract package solicited and awarded fixed-price and the "over and above work" 
contract line item cost-reimbursable with no fee. 
(6) NA VSEA 028, if local testing of a "hybrid" contract type is successful, 
develop policy concerning "hybrid" contract types for ship repair. 
D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Brief answers to the research questions are presented in this section. 
The primary research question was as follows: 
How should the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions be incorporated into 
ship repair contracts? 
To fully optimize the utility of the "over and above work" concept, a "hybrid" 
contract type should be used to incorporate the DF ARS "over and above work" provisions 
into ship repair contracts, with the basic contract package solicited and awarded fixed-
price and the "over and above work" contract line item cost-reimbursable with no fee. 
The subsidiary research questions were as follows: 
( 1) What is "over and above work?" 
"Over and above work" is also known as growth work or emergent work. It is 
work discovered during the performance of the contract that is within the general scope of 
the contract, but not covered by the line item(s) for the basic contract work, and is 
necessary to be performed in order to satisfactorily complete the overhaul, maintenance, 
or repair contract. 
(2) To what extent is "over and above work" discovered during ship repair 
contract performance? 
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The extent of "over and above work" varies from one SUPSHIP office to another, 
from one year to another, and from one ship repair contract to another. Some SUPSHIP 
offices experience little or no growth work, or "over and above work," while other 
SUP SHIP offices experience growth work as much as 100 percent above the contract 
award price. From FY 1985 to FY 1993, the percentage of growth work above the 
contract award price for selected CNO availabilities at SUPSHIP San Diego ranged from 
an average low of seventeen percent to an average high of ninety-nine percent. 
(3) What are the significant benefits in using the "over and above work" 
provisions in ship repair contracts? 
The single most notable effect of incorporating the DF ARS "over and above 
work" provisions into the ELLIOT SRA contract is the significant decrease in the amount 
of time it takes from the submittal of the IDR by the contractor to the issuance of a 
modification by the Government. Since it is possible to review the IDR and COP A, get 
an independent Government estimate, and negotiate a settlement with the contractor in as 
little as one to three days, the amount of "unauthorized" growth work, or "over and above 
work" started before the ACO authorizes the contractor to proceed or before the 
modification is issued, will be significantly reduced, if not eliminated. 
Using a "hybrid" contract type to incorporate the DF ARS "over and above work" 
provisions into ship repair contracts, with the basic contract package solicited and 
awarded fixed-price and the "over and above work" contract line item cost-reimbursable 
with no fee, will facilitate D & D negotiations since D & D is not an issue in a cost type 
contract environment. Using a "hybrid" contract type will also force the contractor to 
submit more realistic FFP ship repair contract bids since the contractor will not be able to 
receive any fee on the "over and above work" to offset the losses incurred as a result of a 
low-ball FFP bid on the basic contract package. This may also keep the contractor from 
searching for every possible need for "over and above work" in order to get well. Thus, 
the contractor will only propose "over and above work" that is truly needed in order to 
complete the contract. As a result, the cost growth and schedule overruns experienced by 
ship repair contracts will be reduced. 
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(4) What are the significant problems m usmg the "over and above work" 
provisions in ship repair contracts? 
Any problems with the use of the DF ARS "over and above work" provlSlons 
encountered during the ELLIOT SRA contract were minor in nature. Initially, SUPSHIP 
San Diego personnel had a hard time with the change in routine. But once they had time 
to think about and absorb the realities of the provisions, they realized the change was 
minimal and required very little adaptation to the normal way they did business. 
(5) How is "over and above work" currently being addressed in ship repau 
contracts? 
The MSC has approval to use its Additional Requirements Clause as an 
alternative to using the DFARS "Over and Above Work" Clause at 252.217-7028. Most 
SUP SHIP offices use the Changes Clause at 252.217-7003 to get "over and above work" 
negotiated into the contract as a growth item, with each SUPSHIP office having its own 
particular procedural and documentation requirements. 
(6) What modifications should be made to the DF ARS "over and above work" 
provisions? 
The DF ARS "over and above work" provisions should be modified to allow the 
use of a "hybrid" contract type to incorporate the provisions into ship repair contracts, 
with the basic contract package solicited and awarded fixed-price and the "over and above 
work" contract line item cost-reimbursable with no fee. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following are suggested areas for further research: 
(1). Cost growth and schedule overrun problems experienced at private and 
public shipyards since FY 1989. 
(2). The appropriate contract type for ship repair contracts. 
(3). The impact of The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 on the 
solicitation, awarding, performance, and administration of ship repair contracts. 
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F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis. This 
chapter also presented brief answers to the research questions. In addition, this chapter 




































APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS 
Agreement for Boat Repair 
Administrative Contracting Officer 
Contract Line Item Number 
Chief ofNaval Operations 
Change Order Price Analysis 
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative 
Delay and Disruption 
Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council 
Defense Contract Audit Agency 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
Defense Logistics Agency 
Department of Defense 
Dry dock Selected Restricted Availability 
Firm-Fixed-Price 
Fiscal Year 
General and Administrative 
General Accounting Office 
Government and Contract Affairs 
Inspection Deficiency Report 
Memorandum of Agreement 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Military Sealift Command 
Master Ship Repair Agreement 
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Office of General Counsel 
San Diego Ship Repair Association 
Standard Form 
Statement of Work 
Selected Restricted Availability 
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair 
Southwest Marine, Inc. 
Undefinitized Contractual Action 
Work in Progress Report 
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APPENDIX B. DFARS SUBPART 217.77--0VER AND ABOVE 
WORK 
217. 7700 Scope of subpart. 
This subpart prescribes policies and procedures for acquisition of over and above work. 
217. 7701 Procedures. 
(a) Contracts for the performance of maintenance, overhaul, modification, and 
repair of various items (e.g., aircraft, engines, ground support equipment, ships) 
generally contain over and above work requirements. When they do, the 
contracting officer shall establish a separate contract line item for the over and 
above work. 
(b) Over and above requirements task the contractor to identify needed repairs and 
recommend corrective action during contract performance. The contractor 
submits a work request to identify the over and above work and, as appropriate, 
the Government authorizes the contractor to proceed. 
(c) The clause at 252.217-7028, Over and Above Work, requires the contractor 
and the contracting officer responsible for administering the contract to negotiate 
specific procedures for Government administration and contractor performance of 
over and above work requests. 
(d) The contracting officer may issue a blanket work request authorization 
describing the manner in which individual over and above work requests will be 
administered and setting forth a dollar limitation for all over and above work 
under the contract. The blanket work request authorization may be in the form of 
a letter or contract modification (Standard Form 30). 
(e) Over and above work requests are within the scope of the contract. Therefore, 
procedures in Subpart 217.74, Undefinitized Contractual Actions, do not apply. 
(f) To the maximum extent practical, over and above work shall be negotiated 
prior to performance of the work. 
217. 7702 Contract clause. 
Use the clause at 252.217-7028, Over and Above Work, in solicitations and contracts 
containing requirements for over and above work, except as provided for in Subpart 
217.71. 
Source: [Ref. 3:217.77-1] 
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APPENDIX C. DFARS 252.217-7028 OVER AND ABOVE WORK 
As prescribed in 217.7702, use a clause substantially as follows: 
OVER AND ABOVE WORK (DEC 1991) 
(a) Definitions. 
As used in this clause--
(1) "Over and above work" means work discovered during the course of 
performing overhaul, maintenance, and repair efforts that is--
(i) Within the general scope of the contract; 
(ii) Not covered by the line item(s) for the basic work under the 
contract; and 
(iii) Necessary in order to satisfactorily complete the contract. 
(2) "Work request" means a document prepared by the Contractor which 
describes over and above work being proposed. 
(b) The Contractor and Administrative Contracting Officer shall mutually agree to 
procedures for Government administration and Contractor performance of over 
and above work requests. If the parties cannot agree upon the procedures, the 
Administrative Contracting Officer has the unilateral right to direct the over and 
above work procedures to be followed. These procedures shall, as a minimum, 
cover--
(1) The format, content, and submission of work requests by the 
Contractor. Work requests shall contain data on the type of discrepancy 
disclosed, the specific location of the discrepancy, and the estimated labor 
hours and material required to correct the discrepancy. Data shall be 
sufficient to satisfy contract requirements and obtain the 
authorization of the Contracting Officer to perform the proposed work; 
(2) Government review, verification, and authorization of the work; and 
(3) Proposal pricing, submission, negotiation, and definitization. 
(c) Upon discovery of the need for over and above work, the Contractor shall 
prepare and furnish to the Government a work request in accordance with the 
agreed-to procedures. 
(d) The Government shall--
(1) Promptly review the work request; 
(2) Verify that the proposed work is required and not covered under the 
basic contract line item(s); 
(3) Verify that the proposed corrective action is appropriate; and 
( 4) Authorize over and above work as necessary. 
(e) The Contractor shall promptly submit to the Contracting Officer a proposal for 
the over and above work. The Government and Contractor will then negotiate a 
settlement for the over and above work. Contract modifications will be executed 
to definitize all over and above work. 
(f) Failure to agree on the price of over and above work shall be a dispute within 
the meaning of the Disputes clause of this contract. 
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(End of clause) 
Source: [Ref. 5:252.217-25 and 26] 
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APPENDIX D. MSC 5252.217-9801 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
(JAN 1991) 
(a) 
( 1) The Contractor shall schedule the performance of all items of the work 
package, including the Category B Items set forth in CLIN 0002 and the 
Contractor Price Breakdown, so as to permit up to a total of (e.g., 90,000) direct 
production (both prime and subcontractor) manhours of work to be performed as 
"Additional Requirements" (including supplemental, emergent and new work). 
The contractor agrees that these Additional Requirements manhours, if ordered, 
shall be performed concurrently with the aforementioned work items, during the 
contract period of performance, without impacting, accelerating, or causing delay 
or disruption to the work required by the aforementioned work items, to any other 
Government contract, or to any other work in progress for the Government. 
(2) The "Additional Requirements," if required, shall be ordered during the 
contract period of performance, as may be modified, on the following schedule: 
(i) No more than 75% of the hours during the second quarter of the 
contract availability. 
(ii) No more than 50% of the hours during the third quarter ofthe contract 
availability. 
(iii) No more than 30% of the hours during the fourth quarter of the 
contract availability. 
(iv) No more than 20% of the hours during the (e.g., last twenty days) of 
shipyard availability through and including the day of redelivery of the 
vessel by the shipyard, as such date may be extended by contract 
modification. 
(b) Whenever the Government orders Additional Requirements pursuant to this clause, 
the contractor shall submit a price proposal for such work. This proposal shall be 
submitted within three days of the receipt of the government's request for a proposal, or 
within such additional time provided in writing by the Contracting Officer. The 
contractor's failure to submit its proposal within the three days, or such extended period 
of time, may be considered a failure of the parties to negotiate a fair and reasonable price 
for the "Additional Requirements" and will permit the Contracting Officer to take any of 
the three options set forth in subparagraph (c) below. "Additional Requirements" 
proposals shall be priced using the fully loaded rate set forth in Section B, CLIN 0005. 
The Contractor shall indicate the fully loaded manhour labor rate (including profit, G~A, 
QA, supervision, support functions, and all indirect charges). This rate will be used in 
evaluating the Contractor's proposal and also will be used for negotiating changes as 
required by this clause. The contractor agrees that the number of man hours included in 
its price proposal for such Additional Requirements shall include only direct production 
manhours. For these purposes, direct production manhours (both prime and 
subcontractor) are for skilled labor at the journeyman level expended in direct production 






















Direct production manhours will not include those functions (whether charged directly or 
indirectly by the offeror's accounting system) which are herein defined as support for 
production functions. Necessary support functions shall be considered to be included in 
the offeror's fully burdened rate for direct production manhours. Examples of support 
functions include: 
Testing Quality Assurance 
Planning Cleaning (except tank cleaning) 
Material Handling & Security 
Warehousing Administration 
Surveying Purchasing staff 
Transportation Lofting 
Supervision Other indirect support 
Material costs will not be included in the "Additional Requirements" direct production 
manhour rate. Material costs and profit for material costs shall be proposed as part of the 
contractor's proposal if "Additional Requirements" are ordered. 
(c) Upon receipt of the Contractor's price proposal for the "Additional Requirements" the 
Contractor and the Contracting Officer shall negotiate the scope of the effort. If a fair and 
reasonable price cannot be negotiated between the Contractor and the Contracting 
Officer, the Contracting Officer reserves the right to: 
(1) Have the work performed by the Government; 
(2) Conduct a separate competitive procurement for the "Additional 
Requirements," resulting in the award of a contract which may be performed 
during the original period of performance of this contract; 
(3) Defer the work to a designated post-overhaul repair period which will be the 
subject of a separate procurement. 
In cases of (1) and (2) above, Government personnel and/or other contractor personnel 
may perform the "Additional Requirements" during the performance period of'this 
contract at the initial prime contractor's facility pursuant to the "Access to Vessels" 
clause. 
(d) 
(1) The Contractor warrants and hereby certifies that its price for the firm fixed 
portion ofthis Contract (CLINs 0001, 0001AA, 0002, 0003, 0006, and 0007) does 
not include any amount for the "Additional Requirements" (CLIN 0005). 
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"Additional Requirements" (CLIN 0005), if any, will be added by supplemental 
agreement, contract modification, or change order. 
(2) It is recognized, however, that, should the Government elect to pursue the 
options outlined in subparagraph (c) (1) and (2) above, the presence of the 
Government or another contractor may delay, disrupt or otherwise adversely 
impact upon the performance of this Contract. Consequently, the contractor's 
price for the firm fixed price portion of the Contract (CLINs 0001, 0001AA, 0002, 
0003, 0006, and 0007) will be deemed to include all costs, if any, of supporting 
one or more third parties (including Government employees and/or other 
contractor's workers) at the overhaul site in performance of "Additional 
Requirements," should the Government elect to pursue such a course. Increased 
costs that may result from third party presence as described above, may include, 
but are not limited to: insurance; physical plant security; reasonable access for 
third party workers who must transit the contractor's facility or any other work site 
provided by the contractor at which the ship may be berthed; utilities used aboard 
the ship or in proximity of the ship in support of the overhaul; and similar 
requirements. Third party presence will occur only if the prime ship repair 
contractor and the Government cannot agree upon a fair and reasonable price. 
The Contractor should be guided in determining the costs, if any, of supporting 
such third party presence in its price proposal for CLINs 0001, OOOlAA, 0002, 
0003, 0006, and 0007 based on a risk assessment relative to the probability of 
proposing fair and reasonable prices versus reaching a potential impasse with the 
Government which would precipitate third party presence. 
(3) The Contractor knowingly and voluntarily waives all claims against the 
Government and/or other third party contractors for delay, disruption, loss of 
efficiency, or other impact arising out of or based upon the presence of 
Government or other contractor employees performing the "Additional 
Requirements" at this contractor's facility. Furthermore, in cases described in sub-
paragraphs (c) (1) and (2) above, the Contractor waives any right to claims of 
interference under the "Access to Vessels" clause. 
(e) The contractor agrees that its manhour rate for the (e.g., 90,000) manhours of 
"Additional Requirements" includes the complete and full compensation to which it is 
entitled, including, but not limited to, compensation for all the direct labor costs, (e.g., 
straight time, overtime, premium time, shift differential, holiday time, standby time, etc.) 
for performing the Additional Requirements, as well as compensation for acceleration, 
delay and disruption and other impact, if any, to the aforementioned work items, to work 
performed under any other Government contract and to any other work in progress for the 
Government. The contractor further agrees that it is not entitled to a time extension to the 
delivery date of any ship under a Government contract by reason of or as a result of the 
ordering of (e.g., 90,000) manhours of "Additional Requirements." 
(f) "Additional Requirements" does not include work performed pursuant to the clauses 
of this Contract entitled "Inspection of Supplies and Services," "Guarantees," or other 
contract provisions relating to the corrections of defects. 
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(g) The cost to the Government of "Additional Requirements" work performed by 
subcontractors shall not exceed the cost per direct production manhour for work required 
by CLIN 0005. 
(h) The contractor agrees that the Government's rights under this clause are in addition to 
and do not abrogate its rights under the Changes Clause. 
Source: [Ref. 14:5-9] 
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APPENDIX E. DFARS 252.217-7003 CHANGES 
As prescribed in 217.7104(a), use the following clause: 
CHANGES (DEC 1991) 
(a) The Contracting Officer may, at any time and without notice to the sureties, by 
written change order, make changes within the general scope of any job order 
issued under the Master Agreement in--
(1) Drawings, designs, plans, and specifications; 
(2) Work itemized; 
(3) Place of performance ofthe work; 
(4) Time of commencement or completion of the work; and 
(5) Any other requirement of the job order. 
(b) If a change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or time required for, 
performance of the job order, whether or not changed by the order, the 
Contracting Officer shall make an equitable adjustment in the price or date of 
completion, or both, and shall modify the job order in writing. 
( 1) Within ten days after the Contractor receives notification of the 
change, the Contractor shall submit to the Contracting Officer a request for 
price adjustment, together with a written estimate of the increased cost. 
(2) The Contracting Officer may grant an extension of this period if the 
Contractor requests it within the ten day period. 
(3) If the circumstances justify it, the Contracting Officer may accept and 
grant a request for equitable adjustment at any later time prior to final 
payment under the job order, except that the Contractor may not receive 
profit on a payment under a late request. 
(c) If the Contractor includes in its claim the cost of property made obsolete or 
excess as a result of a change, the Contracting Officer shall have the right to 
prescribe the manner of disposition of that property. 
(d) Failure to agree to any adjustment shall be a dispute within the meaning of the 
Disputes clause. 
(e) Nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the 
job order as changed. 
(End of clause) 
Source: [Ref. 4:252.217-3 and 4] 
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APPENDIX F. SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO FY 1985 TO FY 1994 
GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE,CONTRACT AWARD PRICE, FINAL 
CONTRACT COST, AND GROWTH WORK DATA FOR SELECTED 
CNO AVAILABILITIES. 
FY 1985 1986 1987 
No. of Contracts 11 12 26 
Govt. Estimate 
FY Total $106,841 ,489 $42,070,346 $84,453,422 
FY Avg. 9,712,863 3,505,862 3,248,209 
Contract Award Price 
FY Total 50,085,748 25,752,989 75,706,816 
FY Avg. 4,553,250 2,146,082 2,911,801 
Govt. Estimate Exceeds 
Contract A ward Price 
FY Total 56,755,741 16,317,357 8,746,606 
FY Avg. 5,159,613 1,359,780 336,408 
Ratio of A vg. Contract 
A ward Price to Govt. 
Estimate 47% 61% 90% 
Percent That A vg. Contract 
Award Price is Below Govt. 
Estimate 53% 39% 10% 
Final Contract Costs 
FY Total 99,911,776 30,086,636 88,801,959 
FY Avg. 9,082,889 2,507,220 3,415,460 
Contract Growth 
FY Total 49,826,028 4,333,647 13,095,143 
FY Avg. 4,529,639 361,137 503,659 
Percent of Growth Work 
Above Contract Award 
Price 99% 17% 17% 
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FY 1988 1989 1990 
No. of Contracts 16 19 22 
Govt. Estimate 
FY Total $54,136,076 $66,931,598 $81,859,546 
FY Avg. 3,383,505 3,522,716 3,720,888 
Contract A ward Price 
FY Total 49,328,716 62,186,181 71,378,608 
FY Avg. 3,083,045 3,272,957 3,244,482 
Govt. Estimate Exceeds 
Contract Award Price 
FY Total 4,807,360 4,745,417 10,480,938 
FY Avg. 300,460 249,759 476,406 
Ratio of A vg. Contract 
Award Price to Govt. 
Estimate 91% 93% 87% 
Percent That A vg. Contract 
A ward Price is Below Govt. 
Estimate 9% 7% 13% 
Final Contract Costs 
FY Total 63,482,902 81,431,296 88,795,724 
FY Avg. 3,967,681 4,285,858 4,036,169 
Contract Growth 
FY Total 14,064,236 19,245,115 17,417,116 
FY Avg. 879,015 1,012,901 791,687 
Percent of Growth Work 
Above Contract Award 
Price 29% 31% 24% 
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FY 1991 1992 1993 
No. of Contracts 23 37 13 
Govt. Estimate 
FY Total $57,195,282 $144,194,710 $50,965,469 
FY Avg. 2,486,751 3,897,154 3,920,421 
Contract Award Price 
FY Total 42,279,166 108,257,971 32,018,621 
FY Avg. 1,838,225 2,925,891 2,462,971 
Govt. Estimate Exceeds 
Contract Award Price 
FY Total 14,916,116 35,936,739 18,946,848 
FY Avg. 648,527 971,263 1,457,450 
Ratio of A vg. Contract 
A ward Price to Govt. 
Estimate 74% 75% 63% 
Percent That A vg. Contract 
Award Price is Below Govt. 
Estimate 26% 25% 37% 
Final Contract Costs 
FY Total 58,228,139 156,600,709 46,354,209 
FY Avg. 2,531,658 4,232,452 3,565,708 
Contract Growth 
FY Total 15,948,973 48,342,738 14,335,588 
FY Avg. 693,434 1,306,560 1,102,738 
Percent of Growth Work 
Above Contract Award 
Price 38% 45% 45% 
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FY 1994 
No. of Contracts 20 
Govt. Estimate 
FY Total $69,646,587 
FY Avg. 3,482,329 
Contract A ward Price 
FY Total 41,413,134 
FY Avg. 2,070,657 
Govt. Estimate Exceeds 
Contract A ward Price 
FY Total 28,233,453 
FY Avg. 1,411,673 
Ratio of A vg. Contract 
Award Price to Govt. 
Estimate 59% 
Percent That A vg. Contract 
Award Price is Below Govt. 
Estimate 41% 
Source: [Ref. 18] 
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APPENDIX G. ELLIOT SRA CONTRACT "OVER AND ABOVE 
WORK" PROVISIONS 
C-28 OVER AND ABOVE WORK 
(1) This over and above item is for the purpose of covering work which is 
required to be performed under other CLIN s of this contract but which is not 
included within the scope and prices of those CLINs. The Contractor is tasked 
with identifying needed repairs and recommending corrective action during 
contract performance for those deficiencies discovered which are not covered by 
the basic contract or subsequent contract modifications (supplemental 
agreements). Needed repairs and corrective action to be considered under this 
provision will be submitted to the Government in the form of an Inspection 
Deficiency Report (IDR); also known as a "Work Request" within the meaning of 
the clause of this contract entitled "Over and Above Work" (DFARS 252.217-
7028). It is anticipated that the estimated costs for these series of related changes 
will exceed $100,000. Therefore, the provisions ofF AR 52.243-6, Change Order 
Accounting, are hereby invoked. 
(2) The following provisions apply to "Over and Above Work Orders:" 
(a) General. Orders for supplies or services may be issued by the ACO at 
any time during the contract period, including any extension thereof. Any 
amounts shown in Section B for over and above work are estimated 
amounts only and are subject to upward or downward adjustment by the 
ACO. It is understood and agreed that the Government has no obligation 
under this contract to issue any orders. 
(b) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The mutually agreed to 
procedures discussed in paragraph (b) of the clause entitled "Over and 
Above Work" (DEC 1991) (DFARS 252.217-7028) are addressed in 
paragraph (d) below. In addition, the following shall also apply for that 
work authorized to proceed prior to negotiating a price: 
(i) Within ten days after the Contractor receives notification to 
proceed with performance for which a price has not been 
negotiated and the Contractor has not submitted a price proposal 
for purposes of negotiation, the Contractor shall submit to the 
Government a proposal. 
(ii) The Contracting Officer may grant an extension of this period 
if the Contractor requests it within the ten day period. 
(iii) If the circumstances permit it, the Contracting Officer inay 
accept and negotiate a price proposal at any later time prior to final 
payment under the job order, except that the Contractor may not 
receive profit on a payment under a late request. 
(c) Limitation of Government Liability. 
(i) The limitation of Government liability, which shall be the 
maximum amount that the Government will be obligated to pay the 
Contractor for performance of the order until the order is 
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definitized, shall be that amount identified on the authorization for 
the contractor to proceed with performance. The Contractor is not 
authorized to make expenditures or incur obligations exceeding the 
limitation of Government liability set forth in the authorization. If 
such expenditures are made, or if such obligations are incurred, 
they will be at the Contractor's sole risk and expense. Further, the 
limitation of liability shall be the maximum Government liability if 
the order is terminated. 
(ii) If at any time the Contractor believes that its expenditure under 
an undefinitized Over and Above Work Order authorization will 
exceed the limitation of Government liability, the Contractor shall 
so notify the Contracting Officer, in writing, and propose an 
appropriate increase in the limitation of Government liability of 
such authorization. Within five days of such notice, the 
Contracting Officer will either (i) notify the Contractor, in writing, 
of such an appropriate increase, or (ii) instruct the Contractor how 
and to what extent the work shall continue, provided however, that 
in no event shall the Contractor be obligated to proceed with work 
on an undefinitized authorization beyond the point where its costs 
incurred plus a reasonable profit thereon exceed the limitation of 
Government liability, and provided also that in no event shall the 
Government be obligated to pay the Contractor any amount in 
excess of the limitation of Government liability specified in any 
such order prior to establishment of firm prices. 
(d) Over and Above Work Procedures: The following administrative 
procedures for implementing these provisions apply. 
1. The Contractor will identify needed repairs and recommend 
corrective action during contract performance for those 
deficiencies discovered which are not covered by the basic contract 
or subsequent contract modifications (supplemental agreements). 
Needed repairs and corrective action to be considered under this 
provision will be submitted to the Government in the form of an 
Inspection Deficiency Report (IDR). 
2. As a minimum, the IDR will include the following: 
(a) Identify contract number; 
(b) Serialized by IDR number; 
(c) Identification of the applicable Work Item number; 
(d) Description of the discrepancy not covered by the basic 
contract or subsequent contract modifications; 
(e) Specific location of the discrepancy; 
(f) Recommendation for corrective action; 
(g) Estimate of the direct labor hours (to include any 
administrative time in direct support of the contract (i.e., 
allocable), overtime, double time, delay and disruption 
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hours, etc.), subcontractor costs and material costs required 
to correct the discrepancy. This information is to be 
submitted as an attachment to the IDR. 
(h) If sufficient information is available, attach a detailed 
Change Order Price Analysis (COPA), in sufficient detail 
with which to negotiate a firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract 
modification, in lieu of estimates; 
(i) Annotate the IDR to indicate whether the attached price 
information represents a COPA (to be negotiated) or 
estimates; and 
G) Identify any related changes, if any, to the contract 
delivery schedule (to include internal milestone dates) 
located in standard work item 042-01-001, Scheduling, 
Progressing, Material Status and Associated Reports. If 
none, so state. 
Any IDR submitted to the Government which does not include the 
above data will be returned to the Contractor (as incomplete) for 
resubmission. 
3. Required work will not be "split" into several IDRs to avoid any 
given dollar threshold (audit requirement, technical advisory 
report, etc.). 
4. To the maximum extent possible, all efforts will be made to 
negotiate a FFP contract modification prior to the start of work. 
Negotiations will be conducted in accordance with established 
procedures. 
5. The Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) will initial all 
IDR responses which authorize the Contractor to proceed with 
corrective action prior to the price being negotiated. In addition, 
the authorization will include a dollar amount which represents the 
limitation of Government liability. Written authorization to 
proceed, which includes the limitation of Government liability, 
must be received by the Contractor from the ACO before 
performance. 
6. Upon receipt of an IDR response initialed by the ACO but not 
yet negotiated, the Contractor shall diligently proceed with 
performance. The Contractor shall also prepare a detailed COP A 
for submission to the ACO within ten working days. The 
Contractor further agrees that the total proposed price of the COP A 
will not exceed the estimate submitted with the IDR. 
7. All work authorized and performed as a result of this tasking 
will be funded under CLIN 0004 through 0006 in Section B of the 
contract. No invoices will be submitted against CLINs 0004 
through 0006 and CLIN s 0004 through 0006 will not be 
incorporated into the Work in Progress Report (WKP 500) for 
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Source: [Ref. 15:8-11] 
purpose of calculating percentage of work completed. The WKP 
500 will always show zero (0) progress for the over and above 
work CLIN. Work request proposals will be negotiated and 
definitized by use of a Standard Form (SF) 30. This SF 30 will 
transfer funding from (decrease) CLIN s 0004 through 0006 to 
(increase) an appropriate CLIN for that work item. Provisions of 
DFARS 252.217-7007, Payments (DEC 1991), will then apply for 
invoicing. 
8. The COP A will be negotiated using established procedures. 
Failure to agree upon a reasonable price shall be considered a 
question of fact subject to the "DISPUTES" clause of the contract. 
9. Following negotiation of the COPA and preparation of the 
contract modification (SF 30), the Government shall update the 
Work in Progress Report (WKP 500) to reflect actual work 
performed as of the negotiation settlement date. 
10. The Contractor shall segregate and track costs in accordance 
with the Change Order Accounting provisions of the contract. Any 
work authorized to proceed prior to reaching agreement on a 
negotiated price, or which is not negotiated prior to completion of 
performance, will be negotiated based on actual costs incurred 
("booked costs" for the modification being negotiated). Actual 
incurred costs submitted by the Contractor will be subject to 
review and verification (as determined by the ACO) by the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). 
11. At the end of contract performance and after all Over and 
Above Work has been definitized, a bilateral SF 30 will be 
prepared and executed deobligating unused funding on the CLINs. 
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APPENDIX H. SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO "OVER AND ABOVE WORK" 
TEST RESULTS 
ELLIOT COPELAND RENTZ 
(SRA) (SRA) (DSRA) 
Ratio IDRs:Mods 3.9:1 5.7:1 7.4:1 
No. Mods Issued 72 57 91 
A vg. no. days from 
IDR receipt to 2.5 12.3 14.9 
negotiated modification 
All three ships were in FFP availabilities at SWM during same period. 
Source: [Ref. 1 7] 
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